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RESPONSIBILITY FOR CED STATEMENTS ON NATIONAL POLICY
The Committee for Economic Development
is an independent research and policy organiza-
tion of some 250 business leaders and educators.
CED is non-profit, non-partisan, and non-politi-
cal. Its purpose is to propose policies that bring
about steady economic growth at high employ-
ment and reasonably stable prices, increased pro-
ductivity and living standards, greater and more
equal opportunity for every citizen, and an
improved quality of life for all.  
All CED policy recommendations must have
the approval of trustees on the Research and
Policy Committee. This committee is directed
under the bylaws, which emphasize that “all
research is to be thoroughly objective in charac-
ter, and the approach in each instance is to be
from the standpoint of the general welfare and
not from that of any special political or econom-
ic group.”  The committee is aided by a Research
Advisory Board of leading social scientists and by
a small permanent professional staff.  
The Research and Policy Committee does not
attempt to pass judgment on any pending specif-
ic legislative proposals; its purpose is to urge care-
ful consideration of the objectives set forth in this
statement and of the best means of accomplish-
ing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive dis-
cussions, meetings, and exchange of memoran-
da.  The research is undertaken by a subcommit-
tee, assisted by advisors chosen for their compe-
tence in the field under study.  
The full Research and Policy Committee par-
ticipates in the drafting of recommendations.
Likewise, the trustees on the drafting subcom-
mittee vote to approve or disapprove a policy
statement, and they share with the Research and
Policy Committee the privilege of submitting
individual comments for publication.
The recommendations presented herein are those
of the trustee members of the Research and Policy
Committee and the responsible subcommittee.  They
are not necessarily endorsed by other trustees or by
non-trustee subcommittee members, advisors, con-
tributors, staff members, or others associated with
CED.
This policy statement was completed before the release of the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO)
Interim Report, An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004 on March 7, 2003.  The
fundamental analysis and conclusions of this policy statement are not changed by the data and estimates
in that report.  However, CBO's ten-year baseline deficit projections have deteriorated somewhat in com-
parison with those it made in January, principally as a result of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2003.
Using the new CBO estimates, CED's projections of a more realistic budget outlook for the next decade
would be even more unfavorable than those shown in Chapter 2.  The projected 2004-2013 deficit would
be roughly $2.5-3.0 trillion, with annual deficits early in the next decade on the order of $350-450 billion.
Were all the President's new proposals to be enacted, the projections would show those annual deficits to
be roughly $600-700 billion and the 2004-2013 deficit to be $4.0-5.0 trillion.
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PURPOSE OF THIS STATEMENT
Since 1947, the Committee for Economic
Development (CED) has championed federal fis-
cal discipline to sustain America’s long-term eco-
nomic health.  CED first did so in the seminal
statement Taxes and the Budget: A Program for
Prosperity in a Free Economy (1947) and more
recently in Restoring Prosperity: Budget Choices for
Economic Growth (1992). Federal budget deficits
raise interest rates, reduce domestic investment,
and increase America’s foreign indebtedness.
Today, this reality is as relevant and important as
it was six decades ago.  In this statement, CED
explains why America’s federal fiscal policy is
pointed in the wrong direction and how to
change course to better protect economic
growth and the living standards of future gener-
ations.
The federal government brought its borrow-
ing under control in the mid-1990’s. But, in
recent years, this discipline has dissolved. The
Congressional Budget Office’s projected ten-year
budget surplus for this decade has gone from
$5.61 trillion to nearly zero. Only part of this
deterioration can be attributed to a weak econo-
my and a lower stock market; the majority of the
collapse can be directly linked to policy deci-
sions. Adjusting the projections to reflect more
realistic assumptions, and the economic effects
of the aging of the baby boom generation,
deficits now extend “as far as the eye can see.” 
Absent significant changes to current policy,
America will be ill-prepared for this imminent
demographic transition. If policymakers do not
begin making hard decisions today that restore
fiscal balance, America will face an even larger
and more painful retrenchment in the future.    
This statement concludes with a series of
principles and recommendations that address
both budget process and policy. We recognize
that our proposed program is ambitious, but we
believe that bold reforms are necessary to close
the long-run fiscal gap and to insure that the
American dream lives on, with future genera-
tions continuing to enjoy better living standards
than those before them.  
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CED believes that the official budget projec-
tions by the Administration and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) significantly
understate the nation’s fiscal problem.  In the
short term, they do not allow for pending actions
(such as making tax cuts permanent, providing
prescription drugs to seniors, and possible war
and reconstruction in Iraq) that will exacerbate
the deficit.  In the longer run, they do not
account for the aging of the population, which
will put both a drag on economic growth and
massive demands on the federal budget.  This
makes it essential to conserve fiscal resources
now to grow the economy for the future.
Deficits matter – they lead to less investment,
less productivity, and a lower future standard of
living.  They are large and about to become very
large.  Were we to put the budget on a sound
actuarial footing through 2075 – the lifetime of
a child born today – we would have to close a
gap of almost 5 percent of gross domestic product –
equivalent to current spending cuts or tax increases of
roughly $500 billion per year.  Any deficit reduction
program to significantly reduce a gap of this size
will necessarily require a “war on many fronts” –
reshaping Social Security, reforming Medicare
and Medicaid, rationalizing defense and home-
land security spending, as well as raising addi-
tional and alternative tax revenues.  For this rea-
son, we should reject any short-term stimulus
that adds to future deficits and slows growth
later.  None of these actions are pleasant.  But
all of them must be taken to secure our nation’s
economic future.
SUBSTANTIVE FINDINGS
Current budget projections seriously understate
the problem.  In 2001, CBO foresaw a cumulative
budget surplus of $5.6 trillion for the ten years
2002-2011; two years later, that $5.6 trillion is
effectively zero.  And this new projection does
not take into account the strong likelihood that
the 2001 tax cuts will be made permanent, that
the rapidly expanding Alternative Minimum
Tax will be scaled back, or that war and recon-
struction in Iraq will raise discretionary spend-
ing.  Adjustments for such likely events imply a
ten-year deficit of about $2 trillion, before any
new tax proposals are enacted or the costs of a
possible prescription drug program, among
other outcomes, are added.  (See pp. 13-16)
While slower economic growth has caused much
of the immediate deterioration in the deficit,  the
deficits in later years reflect our tax and spending
choices.  By the end of the decade, after the
economy has fully recovered, budget policies are
projected to account for two-thirds of the
increase in the deficit.  (See pp. 10-13)
Deficits do matter.  To the extent deficits are
paid out of domestic saving, they leave less
money behind to finance investments in plant
and equipment, research and technology, and
human capital that make us more productive.
To the extent they are financed by foreigners,
they increase our nation’s international debts,
divert our future income to service those debts,
and increase economic instability.  In either
event, deficits will reduce our future standard of
living.  (See pp. 5-9)
The aging of our population compounds the prob-
lem. The onset of baby boom retirements in the
next decade and the nation’s low fertility rate will
gradually produce an economy with many more
retirees and proportionately far fewer workers,
even after accounting for immigration.  This
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SUMMARY*
*See memoranda by JAMES Q. RIORDAN and THOMAS
J. BUCKHOLTZ (page 40).
means that future Americans will divide a slower-
growing “income pie” into smaller pieces.  But
future consumption needs will not decline; in
fact, the demands of an aging population for
health services, including those financed publicly,
will skyrocket.  This suggests that America will
save even less, and therefore have fewer resources
available to invest for growth.  Later in this centu-
ry, for the first time, Americans may be less well
off than their predecessors.  (See pp. 17-24)   
RECOMMENDATIONS
Principles for Budget Policy (See pp. 26-28)
First, any tenable budget program must address
the budget deficit on every front, including both com-
prehensive spending reductions and alternative or
additional revenues.  The budget choices we face
all appear to be untenable: cutting Social
Security and Medicare; constraining defense
spending; raising taxes.  But that is exactly the
point.  None of these measures alone will suf-
fice; all must be brought to the table to con-
struct a workable solution.  While reshaping
Social Security or Medicare or raising additional
taxes is unattractive, the real choice is between
planned and rational policies now, or more
chaotic and severe steps down the road.  
Second, do no harm.  The first step in climb-
ing out of a hole is to stop digging.  We cannot
afford economic policy decisions today that fur-
ther raise deficits tomorrow.  Recent and pend-
ing tax and spending proposals by the
Administration and decisions by the Congress
should be considered and reexamined in this
longer term context.  
Third, make long-term budgetary balance and
economic growth explicit policy goals. Without
long-term fiscal policy goals, our budget policy is
adrift without an anchor.  Without an anchor,
policy will be driven by the political winds.  It is
essential that current decisions be taken with full
recognition of the harmful consequences that
loom ahead on our current budgetary course.
We are concerned that the Administration’s
2004 budget would raise the ten-year 2004-2013
deficit by about $2.7 trillion and annual deficits
ten years from now by about $500 billion.  
Fourth, give pro-growth policies higher priority.
We must avoid budget cuts that reduce public
investments in favor of today’s consumption.  As
the budget deficit grows, a disproportionate bur-
den of fiscal restraint may fall on education and
training programs that build human capital,
research and development activities that advance
knowledge, and infrastructure investments that
support the private sector.  In previous reports,
CED has noted the importance of such public
investments for economic growth. 
Fifth, distribute the costs of pro-growth policies
equitably.  Who should bear these costs?
Programs with widely shared benefits are prefer-
able to those with benefits tailored narrowly to
few recipients.  In addition, the burden of fiscal
restraint should not be placed disproportionate-
ly on low-income families with little political
voice.  As former OMB Director David Stockman
said, in a different era but a similar context, we
should resist weak claims, not weak claimants.  
Policy Recommendations
1. CED strongly opposes any short-term stimu-
lus program that is not combined with a
plan to restore longer-term budget balance.
We are specifically concerned that the Jobs
and Growth Package proposed by the
Administration, which would raise the
cumulative 2004-2013 deficit by about $920
billion (including interest) and raise the
annual deficit ten years from now by about
$100 billion, does not meet this test.  
(See pp. 28-29)
2. CED believes it is urgent to implement a dis-
ciplined budget process that can address the
long-term fiscal issues that face us.  First,
Congress must restore rationality to the
appropriations process.  Second, we should
implement annual joint budget resolutions,
agreed to by Congress and the President
and enacted into law, that anticipate, pre-
cede, and control all spending and tax legis-
lation.  To enforce the budget decisions of
the joint resolution, we should restore the
caps on discretionary spending and the
Exploding Deficits, Declining Growth: The Federal Budget and the Aging of America
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requirement that changes in tax and entitle-
ment programs be “deficit-neutral.”  Finally,
we also oppose the use of “dynamic scoring”
in making Congress’s official budgetary cost
estimates.  (See pp. 29-31)
3. CED calls on the President and Congress to
establish a goal of balancing the budget (or
producing a surplus) excluding the “off-budg-
et” Social Security accounts over a rolling five-
year horizon. The joint budget resolution
should make clear how the budget policies
of the resolution would promote this goal.
The joint budget resolution should also pro-
vide statistical measures of long-term fiscal bal-
ance (such as the “fiscal gap” and unfunded
government liabilities).  (See p. 30)
4. CED reiterates its proposal to restructure
Social Security into a two-tier system.  The
current basic system would have its benefit
structure modified to ensure its solvency (for
example, by gradually raising the age for full
retirement benefits to 70 by 2030) and
would be supplemented by a second tier of
privately owned Personal Retirement
Accounts funded by mandatory employer
and employee contributions that would raise
returns to future retirees.  (See p. 32)
5. CED reiterates its earlier recommendation
that the federal government restructure the
Medicare program along the lines of the
Federal Employee Health Benefit Program
(FEHBP). We also urge the states to adopt
health care programs similar to FEHBP for
public employees and Medicaid, with contri-
bution structures that encourage choices
based on appraisals of quality and cost.
(See p. 34)
6. CED believes that, whatever the level of
spending, the defense and security budgets
must be cost-effective and focused sharply on
our new national security situation. We urge
the Administration and the Congress to rapid-
ly establish national defense priorities and
program reforms to accomplish this.  The
Tail-to-Tooth Commission, and others, have
made recommendations for reducing over-
head and indirect expenditures and other
measures to reduce costs.  In addition, we
urge the Administration and Congress to pro-
vide special attention and scrutiny to home-
land security expenditures.  (See pp. 35-36)
7. CED recommends that we reduce the growth
of non-security discretionary spending below
its historical level and far below the 9 per-
cent annual growth of the past three years.
Although the Administration sought to
restrain such growth, the enacted omnibus
2003 appropriations bill has raised discre-
tionary spending about $12 billion above the
level earlier agreed to by the President and
the Congressional majority leadership.  The
recent untimely and chaotic appropriations
process has dramatically demonstrated the
need for the strong process reforms we pro-
pose. (See pp. 36-37)
8. CED believes that education reform is too
important to be allowed to fail; the federal
government, which has mandated a national
effort, is obligated to assist the states in
making it work.  We urge the Administration
and Congress to provide the funding need-
ed to do so.  (See p. 37)
9. CED once again urges the Administration
and Congress to make basic research a high
priority in the federal budget.  Funding
should be provided across a broad set of
research fields, without undue concentra-
tion in medical research.  (See p. 37)
10. After reviewing the size of our long-term fis-
cal imbalance and the broad possibilities for
spending reductions in Social Security,
Medicare, national and homeland defense,
and other domestic programs, CED believes
it is extremely unlikely that the long-term
budget problem can be solved without addi-
tional revenues.  We therefore urge the
Administration and Congress to forego at this
time any additional tax reductions (including
the permanent extension of The Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act)
that would further reduce long-term rev-
enues.  Moreover, we should use this oppor-
tunity to begin to explore alternative or addi-
tional long-term sources of revenue and taxa-
tion systems that support our nation’s growth
objectives. (See pp. 37-38)
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Summary, Findings, and Recommendations
When the federal budget for fiscal year 2001
was first submitted to the Congress, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) foresaw a
cumulative budget surplus of $5.6 trillion for
the ten years, 2002-2011.  Two years have now
passed, and, according to the latest CBO projec-
tions, that projected $5.6 trillion surplus is now
effectively zero.  Such a dramatic deterioration
in the fiscal outlook is unprecedented.1
Several years ago the federal budget
appeared to be moving in a “virtuous circle,” in
which surpluses helped finance capital formation
and growth and reduced federal interest costs,
both of which contributed to additional surplus-
es that would further raise economic growth.  By
the time the baby boomers moved into retire-
ment and exercised their claims against the
budget and, more importantly, against the
nation’s future output and income, our produc-
tive capacity and budgetary position would have
strengthened enough to withstand these new
spending requirements.  But a realistic projec-
tion of the budget today shows sustained deficits
that will become far larger when the baby boom
claimants retire.  In short, the budget outlook
has shifted dramatically for the worse, losing all
the ground gained in the last decade.
This CED policy statement traces the rela-
tionships among federal budget deficits, the
nation’s swiftly approaching demographic transi-
tion (a major influence on budgets in the longer
term), and America’s economic future.  The
three are intertwined, but the focus here is on
budget deficits, since they are (or should be) the
factor under our immediate control.  Specifically,
we will address four important questions:
• First, why do budget deficits matter? Unless
one understands why and how deficits have
important economic consequences,  one
cannot know why it’s so important to
address them now.
• Second, how did this fiscal reversal occur?
What were the relative contributions of
changed economic conditions, spending
decisions, tax decisions, and other factors to
our fiscal predicament?
• Third, what is a realistic budget outlook? The
official Administration and CBO budget pro-
jections do not portray the seriousness of the
current situation.  If we use reasonable
assumptions about how the economy will per-
form, the choices politicians may make, and
underlying trends in American society – par-
ticularly regarding the aging of the popula-
tion – the budget outlook is alarming.
• Fourth and finally, what can we do about it?
What major changes in the direction of
long-term fiscal policy must we make to
improve the prospects for long-term eco-
nomic growth, and what are our options for
making them?
The current chapter of this policy statement
and the three that follow answer these questions.
This chapter explains why fiscal deficits matter
to the economy.  The next chapter asks how the
recent projections of sustained surpluses turned
negative so quickly, and what a reasonable pro-
jection for the next five and ten years might now
be.  The third chapter looks beyond the five and
ten year horizons used by federal budget plan-
ners, with an eye to the needs created in future
decades by an aging population.  And the last
chapter examines various options for correcting
the fiscal problems we face.
We wish to emphasize that this policy state-
ment addresses our long-term fiscal predicament
and its impact on the future well being of
4
Chapter 1
An Overview of the Fiscal Problem
Americans, not the issue of short-term fiscal stimu-
lus as an antidote for current weakness in the
economy.  Our recommendations in Chapter 4
have strong implications for short-term policy, but
our focus is on the long-term consequences of
such policy.  We strongly reaffirm our 2001 rec-
ommendation (made shortly after the September
11 terrorist attacks) that short-term policies must
fit within a sound long-term framework.  We
urged then that any fiscal stimulus measures be
timely, effectively targeted, and (especially) “tem-
porary and combined with a credible commit-
ment to future budget surpluses.”2 If we do not
do so, we will make the future problems we
describe even more difficult to resolve.
DO DEFICITS MATTER?
Ever since federal deficits exploded in the
1980’s, economists have debated their short-
and long-term effects.  While there is no una-
nimity among economists, there are some
important principles on which most economists,
and CED, agree.
First, we know that the key to long-term eco-
nomic growth and rising living standards is
increasing productivity, our ability to produce
more goods and services with the resources at
our disposal.  As a forthcoming CED report dis-
cusses in greater detail, we also know that long-
term improvements in productivity come from
three interrelated factors – technological
progress (new ideas), investment (both in physi-
cal capital, which provides workers with more
plant and equipment, while bringing new ideas
into daily use, and human capital, which
improves the skills and abilities of workers), and
reorganization (the capacity to organize produc-
tion to capture the benefits of this innovation).3
The economy grows, therefore, when new ideas
are developed, when they are reflected in a
more productive capital stock and labor force,
and when the economy is flexible and adaptive
enough to respond to new opportunities.
Second, we know that federal budget deficits
interfere with this process primarily by siphon-
ing off funds from private investment (and may
reduce public investment as well, as explained
below).  Deficits usurp the national saving other-
wise available for investment.  Saving diverts
from current consumption the resources needed
to finance plant and equipment, research, hous-
ing, or other investments.  This saving takes the
form of household saving, business profits, and
government surpluses.  Just as the nation’s sav-
ing is diminished when households borrow to
spend more than their income, that saving is
also diminished when the government spends
more than its revenues.  When the government
borrows by selling government debt to finance
the resulting deficit, it reduces the saving avail-
able for private investment at home or abroad.*
By reducing private investment at home, high-
er deficits leave the nation with a smaller capital
stock, giving our workforce fewer tools with which
to work – whether computers and software,
machines, transportation equipment, or buildings
and other structures.  This slows the growth in the
productivity of our workers, which, in turn, leads
to slower growth in living standards.  Deficits —
and the higher mortgage rates that usually accom-
pany them — can also reduce investment in hous-
ing, which also reduces future well being.
Thus, the central charge against fiscal
deficits is that they “crowd out” private domestic
investment by reducing national saving.  The
record of the past 40 years illustrates this rela-
tionship.  Figure 1-1 shows federal deficits (or
surpluses) and total net private domestic invest-
ment (including housing) for 1960-2001 in rela-
tion to net national product (NNP).  Deficits
and investment are inversely related – when
5
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* While lower national saving must reduce national investment,
not all economists agree that larger deficits reduce national sav-
ing.  A minority argues that if deficits rise, households will
increase their saving by a corresponding amount to provide for
future tax increases, to be imposed on either them or their
descendants.  This is an interesting theory, but there is little
empirical evidence that households make significant adjust-
ments of this kind.  The U.S. household saving rate has been
falling more or less continuously since the early 1980s, during
periods of both rising and falling deficits.  Moreover, this view
requires households to have extraordinary foresight; if govern-
ment and private forecasters have been so continually surprised
by rapidly changing deficit forecasts, how are we to assume that
the average household can do better?  See B. Douglas
Bernheim, Ricardian Equivalence: An Evaluation of Theory and
Evidence, Working Paper No. 2330 (Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1987).
deficits rise, investment tends to fall; when
deficits fall (or turn to surpluses), the addition-
al saving tends to “crowd in” more private
investment.  Certainly, many other factors,
including changes in the strength of the econo-
my and the international factors discussed
below, have affected both deficits and domestic
investment over this stretch of history.  But the
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“crowding out” of domestic investment by feder-
al deficits is not just an abstraction suggested by
economic analysis; it has been a historical fact,
particularly during the large changes in the
deficit during the 1980’s and 1990’s.
With regard to the effects of deficits on our
foreign investment, the story is more complex.
U.S. firms and investors that buy U.S. govern-
ment debt can purchase fewer foreign assets,
whether auto plants in Brazil or stocks issued by
enterprises in emerging markets; similarly, for-
eign investors who buy such debt acquire a claim
against the U.S.  In both cases, the U.S. net
international investment position deteriorates –
we own fewer assets abroad, and foreigners own
more of our assets.  Thus, the nation’s wealth
becomes smaller, and incomes of Americans in
the future will be correspondingly reduced –
either because the total income we earn on our
foreign assets will be smaller, or because we must
pay more income to foreigners.
This is a different kind of “crowding out,”
but one that reduces our net wealth today and
our incomes tomorrow just as surely as reduc-
tions in domestic investment do.  And these
future income reductions are not just financial
losses.  When we borrow from abroad, we bor-
row not only financial capital but real goods
and services, reflected in larger trade deficits.
Ultimately, Americans must “pay back” those
goods and services (with interest), either as
increased exports or diminished imports, which
leaves less for consumption tomorrow.
Domestic and foreign “crowding out,” there-
fore, are simply two paths to the same end – a
reduction of our society’s well being tomorrow
to pay for today’s federal deficits and consump-
tion.  Figure 1-2 shows the extremely close rela-
tionship, again for 1960-2001, between federal
deficits and total national investment, both
domestic and foreign.
The linkage between budget deficits and our
foreign investment raises an issue that has figured
prominently in the deficit debate: do larger
deficits raise interest rates?  Elementary economic
reasoning strongly supports such a relationship,
and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
has reaffirmed this view.4 Nevertheless, there has
been considerable controversy about whether the
numerous econometric studies on the subject
confirm the relationship.  A recent review of
these studies, however, finds that, once expecta-
tions about future deficits are taken into account,
a sustained increase in annual budget deficits of
one  percent of GDP can be expected to raise
long-term interest rates by about 50 basis points
after one year.  We believe these findings support
the common sense view that deficits raise interest
rates, reduce domestic investment, and impair
long-term economic growth.5
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Moreover, focusing on the relationship
between deficits and interest rates obscures a
more fundamental point.  As globalization pro-
ceeds and capital markets become more inte-
grated, the impact of deficits on foreign invest-
ment (and on our current account balance)
becomes larger.  Twenty years ago, economists
were surprised to discover that the large deficits
of the 1980’s triggered much more borrowing
from abroad and smaller reductions in domestic
investment than anticipated.  Deficits financed
by borrowing from abroad may not have large
effects on interest rates, since foreign funds
relieve the shortage of domestic saving.  But this
foreign borrowing leaves us heavily mortgaged
and reduces our future income even if interest
rates don’t change.  Thus, deficits do matter,
even if we live in a globalized world that substi-
tutes foreign borrowing for higher interest rates.
The relationship between deficits, saving, and
private investment is not the only way that deficits
affect long-term growth and our future standard
of living.  Two other dangers bear mentioning –
the effects of deficits on productive public invest-
ments† and on economic stability.
CED has consistently been an advocate for
productivity-enhancing public investments such
as basic scientific research, improved public
schools, and expanded access to quality pre-
school education.6 These public investments are
a needed complement to private investment –
basic research builds a store of knowledge that
leads to future technological advances, workforce
skills make new technologies more productive,
and public infrastructure facilitates private busi-
ness activity.  But when budget deficits grow, there
is a danger that desirable public investments will
be cut back.  First, these programs often lack the
broad base of public support for the three largest
items in the budget –national security, Social
Security, and health care.  Second, when deficits
escalate, federal interest expenses also grow, leav-
ing less of the budget available for “discretionary”
uses such as public investment.  As shown in
Figure 1-3, federal expenditures on physical capi-
tal, research and development, and education
and training have been a declining portion of the
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† The U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
include public expenditures on physical capital, such as struc-
tures, equipment, and software, in national saving and invest-
ment.  Other public expenditures that raise future output and
income, such as those on research and development, education,
and training are not included in saving and investment and
therefore add to the computed budget deficit.  A comprehen-
sive capital budget would include such expenditures in saving
and investment, but the problems in defining genuine invest-
ment expenditures are acute.
federal budget for many years, falling from about
34 percent of total expenditures in the early
1960’s to about 15 percent today.7 The potential
budgetary “crowding out” of these expenditures
under the pressure of rising entitlement spending
and larger deficits clearly poses a risk for long-
term economic growth.
Finally, deficits that reduce our net foreign
investment and leave a large stock of foreign
claims against the U.S. not only reduce future
income but make our economy (and, indeed, the
world economy) potentially less stable.  When any
country’s obligations to foreign investors grow
large relative to its capacity to repay, there is an
increasing risk that investors will begin to ques-
tion the quality of those assets – that is, their total
return, including especially the preservation of
principal.  Such a shift in market psychology can
trigger a “run” – that is, an attempt by many
investors to dump their assets on the market at
the same time.  When foreign lenders start dump-
ing a country’s assets, the results for the domestic
economy can be disastrous, as recent experience
in Asia, Russia, and Argentina testifies.
To be sure, the U.S. is not Argentina or
Russia; the role of the dollar as the preeminent
international reserve currency has been unique.
But the U.S. economy will not be immune to
sudden changes in interest rates, exchange
rates, and asset prices if it comes to depend on
ever-larger financial inflows, especially if the
Euro begins to emerge as a competitive reserve
asset.  How large our current account deficit
and foreign indebtedness can grow before they
become unsustainable cannot be determined
with any precision, and will depend on the cir-
cumstances of the time.  But both common
sense and historical evidence suggest that bor-
rowing from abroad cannot be limitless; at some
point, foreign lenders will see escalating new
borrowing as a threat to the value of their assets
and react, to the detriment of the borrower.
The threat of rising foreign indebtedness is
hard to quantify, given the uncertainties inher-
ent in market behavior.  And the effects of
diminished long-term investment, while obvi-
ous, are also difficult to estimate, as noted in
Chapter 3 below.  But the fact of declining and
inadequate saving is not.  Figure 1-4 shows the
U.S. national saving rate going back to 1960.
CED has consistently focused on this disquiet-
ing trend during the past several decades, but
the problem continues to get worse.  Failure to
save is not necessarily a harbinger of economic
collapse; rather, it foreshadows a gradual and
steady undermining of our well-being, more like
arsenic poisoning or termites in the woodwork.
A society that fails to put aside resources for
tomorrow will not have a higher standard of liv-
ing tomorrow.  It is a death of a thousand cuts.
In the following chapter we examine the
outlook for the federal budget and the likely
size of the deficits that lie ahead if we continue
on our present fiscal course.
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Endnotes
After a fifteen year struggle with ballooning
deficits, the federal government finally brought its
budget under control in the mid-1990’s.  In rela-
tion to the size of the economy, the deficits of the
mid-1980’s and early 1990’s had reached levels
not seen since World War II.  Faced with this
bleak budget picture, policymakers managed to
strike a compromise in 1990 known as the Budget
Enforcement Act (BEA).  That law imposed caps
on discretionary spending and established a pay-
as-you-go (PAYGO) rule, requiring that policy
changes that cut taxes or increased entitlement
spending be paid for by changes in other tax or
entitlement legislation.1 This Act, in combination
with rising revenues from the economic boom of
the late 1990s, an increase in tax rates on upper
incomes in 1993, and another bipartisan budget
agreement in 1997, yielded the first string of four
consecutive federal budget surpluses in the post-
war period.  It was a dramatic fiscal turnaround.
In the last several years, however, an eco-
nomic downturn, new requirements for nation-
al and homeland security spending, and new
budget policies have reversed this fiscal
progress.  Today, both budget surpluses and fed-
eral fiscal discipline seem like distant memories.
This chapter tells the story of America’s fiscal
setback.  We examine how the federal govern-
ment has managed to dig itself again into a fis-
cal hole and show why that hole is deeper than
is commonly recognized. 
THE DISAPPEARING SURPLUSES
In just two years, encouraging official pro-
jections of an unending stream of large federal
surpluses have given way to much darker fore-
casts that include substantial deficits.  As of
January 2001, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) was projecting a “baseline” (current poli-
cy) surplus of $359 billion for the current fiscal
year (2003), but, as of January 2003, this pro-
jected surplus had changed into a deficit of
$199 billion.  (Indeed, the Administration’s
2004 budget estimates this 2003 “baseline”
deficit at $264 billion.)  This $558 billion swing
is equivalent to 5.2 percent of GDP for fiscal
year 2003.  For the rest of the decade, the num-
bers tell a similar story.  All told, the large ten
year cumulative surplus once projected for
2002-2011 has effectively disappeared, dropping
from $5.61 trillion in the January 2001 projec-
tion to $0.02 trillion in January 2003.2
The story of the disappearing surpluses
begins in the late 1990’s. Even as the budget
projections were growing rosier and rosier, the
bipartisan budget process began to break down.
With surpluses in hand, policymakers proceeded
to circumvent the rules they had established to
rein in budget deficits.  After fiscal year 1998,
when the first surplus emerged, Congress began
evading the BEA by making large upward adjust-
ments to the discretionary spending caps and by
flouting PAYGO requirements.  (In exploiting
the “flexibility” provisions of the BEA, policy-
makers went so far as to declare the funds for
the constitutionally mandated census in 2000 to
be an “emergency” expenditure!)  [See Figure 2-
1]  After five years of being evaded or ignored,
the discretionary caps and PAYGO mechanism
were allowed to expire in September 2002.
At the same time that BEA was becoming
largely a dead letter, the overarching budget
process established in the Budget Impoundment
Act of 1974 was also increasingly disregarded.
The Budget Impoundment Act was designed to
rationalize the budget process by forcing
Congress to set targets for spending, revenues,
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and budget balance.  However, in the last five
years, the targets set in the budget resolutions
were either violated by wide margins, or budget
resolutions were not passed at all.  [See Figure 2-
2]  The self-imposed budget process, intended
to guide and restrain Congressional policymak-
ers, was broken, and the political stage was set
for a rapid return to budget deficits.3
Unsurprisingly, discretionary spending began
a sharp ascent in the late 1990’s.  After falling (in
inflation-adjusted terms) since fiscal year 1991,
with the help of the “peace dividend” occasioned
by the end of the Cold War, discretionary spend-
ing turned upwards in 1999.  From 1998 through
2002, real discretionary spending jumped 21 per-
cent.4 Then, with President George W. Bush’s
arrival in office, tax cuts rose to the top of the
policy agenda.  The Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) was
the centerpiece, cutting revenues and reducing
projected surpluses by over $1.6 trillion (includ-
ing interest) from 2002 through 2011.5
With policymakers having spent or rebated
in tax cuts much of the projected surpluses, the
economic slowdown that began in early 2001
aggravated an already deteriorating fiscal situa-
tion.  Revenues fell with slowing economic activ-
ity and falling employment, and the precipitous
stock market drop hit the projected surpluses
especially hard.  The flood of federal revenues
from capital gains realizations and other
sources during the late 1990’s dramatically
dried-up.  Altogether, between January 2001
and January 2003, such “economic and techni-
cal changes”* accounted for a remarkable $2.6
trillion reduction (including interest) in the
projected ten year surplus for 2002-2011.
Taking the decade as a whole, CBO’s esti-
mates indicate that 54 percent of the fall in the
ten year cumulative surplus can be attributed to
11
Chapter 2:  The Budget Outlook for the Next Decade
*Adjustments for Desert Shield/Storm are excluded since  the vast majority of the war's costs were paid back to the U.S. by foreign countries.
Source: Congressional Budget Office (CBO), The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2004-2013 (Washington, D.C.: CBO, January 2003), p. 115  
FIGURE 2-1
Policymakers Have Broken Their Own Restraints on Discretionary Spending
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* In the CBO projections, “technical changes” include changes in
estimated capital gains revenues as well as other estimating
changes, including many with a significant economic compo-
nent.  “Economic changes” essentially reflect budget changes
due to changes in the CBO economic forecast of output,
incomes, prices, interest rates, etc.
changes in budget policies (including 30 percent
due to EGTRRA and 22 percent due to increased
spending), while the remaining 46 percent is a
result of economic and technical changes.6
However, it is important to note that the effects
of the economic and technical changes are much
larger in the first half of the decade, reflecting
the budgetary effects of the recent economic
downturn.  As Table 2-1 shows, by the end of the
decade – and reaching into the future – policy
changes are far more important.  Thus, by fiscal
year 2010, policy changes account for almost two-
thirds (63 percent) of the deterioration in the
surplus, whereas economic and technical factors
are associated with only 37 percent.  In short,
while a substantial portion of the current fiscal
deterioration can be blamed on the economy,
responsibility for the fiscal set-back in later years
lies squarely on the shoulders of policymakers. 
A separate but parallel problem exists for
state budgets.  States were awash in revenues
during the boom of the late 1990’s, but are now
retrenching rapidly, drastically cutting expendi-
tures and in some cases raising taxes to address
an estimated aggregate deficit of $50 billion this
fiscal year and between $70 and $85 billion the
next.7 This necessary fiscal retrenchment will
impede national economic recovery, even while
the federal budget has become more expansive.
The circumstances of individual states differ,
but almost all states operate under borrowing
restrictions that require them to take prompt
action.  Thus, state fiscal deficits are likely to be
relatively short-lived when compared with those
of the federal government, although their pro-
grammatic cutbacks will cause significant eco-
nomic and social problems.  The states’ fiscal
retrenchment is therefore important, not only
for its macroeconomic impact, but also because
the federal government may attempt to solve its
own problems by passing them back to the states,
sometimes by imposing unfunded mandates.  We
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FIGURE 2-2
Congressional Budget Resolutions No Longer Guide Fiscal Policy
(Policy Violations* as a Percent of Total Outlays)
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do not know the full extent of these mandates,
but they are currently growing, to varying
extents, in areas such as educational testing and
assessment and front-line homeland security.
Moreover, they may increase in areas such as wel-
fare reform, where the upcoming reauthoriza-
tion may impose stricter work requirements, and
in Medicaid, where the Administration is propos-
ing further devolution to the states in the face of
rapidly rising costs.  In all these cases, there is
the risk that activities will be mandated of the
states, or turned back to them, with no offsetting
long-term revenue sources.  
DEFICITS “AS FAR AS THE EYE CAN SEE”
In spite of their sharp deterioration since
January 2001, the CBO January 2003 projections
do not begin to gauge the likely magnitude of
our fiscal predicament.  Those projections show
the federal government pulling into the clear by
the middle of the decade, with surpluses project-
ed from fiscal year 2007 onwards.  There would
seem to be little reason to worry unduly about
long-term deficits if budget surpluses were to be
soon restored – even if they were significantly
smaller than once expected.  But, this projected
upswing in the fiscal position is unlikely to
occur, since the projections are based on unreal-
istic assumptions about future policy decisions.†
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† We acknowledge that deficit projections ten years into the future
are extremely uncertain, not only with regard to policy actions,
but also (and perhaps especially) with regard to the effects of
changes in the economy, the costs of legislated programs, and
other variables.  (See CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook:
Fiscal Years 2004-2013, Chapter 5.)  However, we do not believe
that this uncertainty implies that we “know nothing” about the
likely ten-year budget path and can therefore ignore the project-
ed effects of the decisions we take.  First, the budgetary effects of
the policy changes we make are far less uncertain than the levels of
the deficits or surpluses that will finally result, so we know a great
deal about the impacts of those policies on the deficit.  Second,
and perhaps more important, the large estimating uncertainty itself
dictates that we should be more prudent in our budget policies than if the
projections were more certain.  The costs of the inevitable errors in
deficit projections are very asymmetric:  It is politically very diffi-
cult to raise taxes or cut spending to address unexpectedly large
deficits, whereas tax cuts or spending increases to address unex-
pectedly large surpluses present no such problem.
TABLE 2-1
Policy Changes Account for Almost Two-Thirds of the Long-Term Fiscal Deterioration
(January 2003 Projection Compared to January 2001 Projection)
 Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), Why the Surplus Has Disappeared (Washington, D.C.: CBPP, 2002); Updated January 2003.
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Changes Due to Legislation
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       Other Tax Legislation
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The most striking lack of realism in the pro-
jections is the assumption (legally required of
CBO) that EGTRRA will expire as provided in
current law, as will other smaller tax reductions.
In order to evade budget rules that would have
restricted its size, EGTRRA was written to expire
after 2010; the tax code would then revert to its
pre-EGTRRA status.  For example, under cur-
rent law the estate tax will be fully repealed at
the end of 2010 but in 2011 will return to its
pre-2001 rates and exemptions, as will individ-
ual rate brackets and the other features of the
code modified in EGTRRA.  No one believes
this will happen.  Indeed, since the day EGTR-
RA arrived on his desk, President Bush and
many in Congress have sought to make EGTR-
RA permanent, and that has now been pro-
posed in the Administration’s 2004 budget.
While some modifications are likely, it is widely
expected that the basic policies of EGTRRA will
be extended – especially the individual rate
reductions, child credit, and marriage penalty
relief, which account for over 80 percent of the
long-term revenue reduction.  Other tax provi-
sions whose expiration would raise revenues will
also almost certainly be extended, as has consis-
tently been the practice in the past.  As shown
in Figure 2-3, these extensions would dramati-
cally raise the path of federal deficits, especially
after fiscal year 2010.  Over 2004-2013, making
all expiring tax cuts permanent would reduce
revenues by $1.2 trillion and raise the cumula-
tive deficit by $1.4 trillion (including interest).8
The effects on deficits in the following decade,
of course, would be far greater.
The CBO projections overestimate the fed-
eral government’s likely revenue stream in
another critical respect.  It is universally recog-
nized that the alternative minimum tax (AMT)
is dysfunctional.  The AMT was designed in the
1960’s to curb aggressive tax avoidance, but was
never intended to apply to a significant propor-
tion of taxpayers.  Among other problems with
the AMT, its exemptions, brackets, and phase-
outs are not indexed to inflation, bringing more
and more taxpayers under the minimum tax
even if their real incomes do not rise.  In addi-
tion, the tax rate reductions in EGTRRA, by
reducing regular income tax liabilities, make
more taxpayers subject to the AMT.  In 2002,
some 2.6 million taxpayers faced the AMT; by
2010, it is projected to apply to 36 million tax-
payers – 33 percent of all filers.9 Again, no one
expects this to happen.  A reform of the AMT
to limit its application is a foregone conclusion,
and the administration is already proposing
“temporary” limitations.  As shown in Figure 2-
3, merely indexing the AMT to inflation starting
in 2003 would raise the ten-year cumulative
deficit by $411 billion (including interest).10
Finally, with the U.S. gearing up to meet
new national defense and homeland security
requirements, including possible war, recon-
struction, and nation-building in Iraq, discre-
tionary spending is likely to grow much faster
than assumed by the CBO.  The CBO baseline
(by law) assumes that inflation-adjusted discre-
tionary spending will remain unchanged over
the ten-year projection period.  Events of recent
years belie this optimism.  From fiscal year 1999
through fiscal year 2002, annual growth in real
discretionary spending has averaged five per-
cent.11 The Administration has been planning
to increase real national security spending by
about four percent annually during this decade
– before accounting for any additional costs
related to Iraq, which have been estimated to
run anywhere from $100 billion to $2 trillion.12
Homeland security spending to defend against
terrorist attack at home is likely to raise non-
defense discretionary spending, which, in any
case, has grown on average at about the same
rate as the economy since the 1960’s.  Thus, it
appears virtually certain that real discretionary
spending will increase during this decade.  As a
matter of prudent budgeting, it seems reason-
able to assume that total discretionary spending
will grow at least as rapidly as the economy dur-
ing the next few years.  This assumption would
add nearly another $1.5 trillion (including
interest) to CBO’s projection of the cumulative
federal deficit during 2004-2013.13
As Figure 2-3 shows, these more realistic
assumptions about expiring tax provisions, revi-
sions to the AMT, and the growth of discre-
tionary spending lead to deficit projections very
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different from those of CBO.14 Instead of a $1.3
trillion ten year surplus, the projections show a
deficit of about two trillion dollars.  And rather
than large and growing budget surpluses in the
next decade, the adjusted projections show
annual deficits of $300-400 billion, increasing “as
far as the eye can see.”  These projections are
not a prediction of budget outcomes, since poli-
cies can and should be adopted to change those
outcomes; we recommend such policies in
Chapter 4.  But the projections are a reasonable
portrayal of the ten-year budget path on which we
are currently traveling and the size of the budget
problem that lies immediately ahead.‡
These projections, however, are not yet the
end of the story of our possible fiscal predica-
ment, for they do not take account of the
Administration’s latest budget proposals.  The
newly-proposed “jobs and growth” tax cut pack-
age would end the individual taxation of divi-
dends paid from retained earnings, accelerate
scheduled income tax rate cuts, accelerate mar-
riage penalty relief, and accelerate and expand
the child tax credit.  This proposal is estimated
to reduce federal revenues during 2004-2013 by
$665 billion, and raise the cumulative deficit
(including interest) by about $920 billion.15 In
addition, the Administration’s other budget
proposals, including the permanent extension
of EGTRRA, would increase the ten-year deficit
by about $1.8 trillion.  All told, the new budget
proposals, if enacted, would raise the ten-year
deficit by about $2.7 trillion and annual deficits
ten years from now by about $500 billion.  The
2013 deficit of $300-325 billion projected in
Figure 2-3 would be raised by $200-250 billion
to about $500-575 billion, after accounting for
Administration proposals (or similar policies)
already included in that projection.16 Moreover,
these projections do not include expenditures
related to a possible war and subsequent recon-
struction in Iraq.
A decade of these growing deficits will leave
15
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‡ The projections in Figure 4 are not, however, a reasonable por-
trayal of the stance of our long term fiscal policy, looking out sev-
eral decades.  The unified budget’s cash accounting system is
inadequate, and indeed highly misleading, for this purpose,
since it does not recognize heavy future spending commitments
for public pensions and health care costs, but does include cur-
rent receipts set aside to fund some of those commitments.  The
net present value in 2001 of unfunded liabilities for Social
Security, Medicare, and Federal employee and veterans’ pension
benefits was about $20 trillion.  See U.S. Treasury, Financial
Report of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2001, pp.10, 58.
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Source: William Gale and Peter Orszag,  Perspectives on the Budget Outlook, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003), Appendix Table 3; Congressional Budget Office (CBO),  
Budget and Economic Outlook: 2004-2013 (Washington, D.C.: CBO, January 2003).
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Endnotes
America ill-prepared for the arrival of the baby-
boomers’ retirement.  In Chapter 1, we
explained why such large federal deficits are
detrimental to the long-term growth of national
income.  In the next chapter, we explore why it
is particularly inappropriate for today’s
Americans to be borrowing against future
income, by tracing out the economic and budg-
etary ramifications of the aging of the U.S. pop-
ulation.
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America faces a major demographic transi-
tion.  In just five years, the first baby boomers
will begin drawing early-retirement Social
Security checks at age 62.  America will then
enter a new era characterized by rapid expan-
sion of retirees coupled with extremely slow
growth in the working age population.  By 2025,
the proportion of the entire U.S. population
over 65 will be greater than in the state of
Florida today.1 This dramatic transformation of
U.S. demographics will have serious implica-
tions for the American economy.
These implications have been primarily dis-
cussed in the context of the Social Security sys-
tem.  Social Security currently is running sur-
pluses, but it is projected to pay out more than
it takes in beginning in 2017 and to exhaust its
accumulated trust fund balances just after
2040.2 Social Security’s potential insolvency
represents a serious problem that should be
resolved swiftly and responsibly.  Nevertheless,
in focusing so intensively on Social Security’s
accounting problems, the country has tended to
ignore the more fundamental economic prob-
lems posed by the demographic transition.
The national debate has not addressed the
overarching issue of how the aging of the popu-
lation will affect Americans’ general standard of
living. It has not addressed the fact that the
demographic transition will put pressure on
consumption standards, potentially causing our
society to cut national saving and thereby slow
economic growth. These are the topics taken up
in this chapter, which is concerned with how the
health of the American economy as a whole –
and not particular government programs –
could be endangered by the aging of the popu-
lation if we do not follow appropriate policies.
Changes in fertility rates and lifespan have,
in combination, produced a rapid aging of the
American population. Figure 3-1 shows the
bulge in the birth-rate between 1946 and 1964 –
the years associated with the arrival of the baby
boom generation. As can also be seen in Figure
3-1, immediately following the baby boom came
the dramatic and still-enduring baby bust. Since
the late 1960’s, the U.S. fertility rate has
remained well below the rates experienced in
the three decades before the baby boom,
including the years of the Great Depression and
World War II.3 The baby boom and bust will
soon translate into large numbers of Americans
retiring with relatively few, younger Americans
growing-up to take their place. 
In addition to a fall in fertility, the U.S., over
the last 50 years, has experienced a dramatic
increase in the lifespan of the elderly. Since 1950,
the life-expectancy of a 65 year old male has
increased by 23 percent.4 [See Figure 3-2] With
the elderly living longer and the baby boomers
retiring, the population 65 and over is projected
to rise from just 13 percent of the total popula-
tion in 2010 to nearly 20 percent in 2030.5
This graying of America is not an ephemeral
phenomenon that will disappear with the baby
boomers. The proportion of the population over
65 is projected to continue growing throughout
the century – far beyond 2030, when all baby
boomers will have reached retirement age.  In this
very long-term, the principal engine of population
aging is expected to be a continued rise in elderly
life expectancy. Between now and 2080, life
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expectancy for a 65 year- old male is projected to
jump another 28 percent.6 [See Figure 3-2] The
fertility rate will also play a role in the long-term
aging process because it is expected to remain rel-
atively low and stable, no acceleration in fertility
would offset the effects of longer elderly life
expectancy.  Looking far ahead in the century, the
elderly will continue to live longer and relatively
few children will continue to be born, making
America’s aging a very long-term, if not perma-
nent, trend.  These fundamental trends in fertility
and life expectancy are likely to be mitigated only
to a small degree by immigration, which itself has
become highly uncertain in the near term due to
political and national security concerns.
THE PRESSURES TO REDUCE
NATIONAL SAVING: THE ECONOMICS
OF AN AGING POPULATION
The demographic transition will translate
into fewer workers per retiree. Over the next 75
years, annual growth in the working age popula-
tion (those between age 20 and 64) is projected
to average just 0.3 percent per year – with low
birth rates and immigration providing just
enough new people of working age to replace
those retiring.  Indeed, growth in the native-
born working age population will slow sharply
during the next ten years, and their numbers
will actually decline in the following decade;
most net labor force growth will have to come
from immigration, which is uncertain and
fraught with a number of other issues.7 Over
this same 75 year period, the population of
retirement age is expected to grow at an annual
rate of 1.3 percent.  As time goes on, therefore,
a growing number of retirees must be support-
ed by the production and income of relatively
fewer workers.  This trend can be expressed as
the elderly dependency ratio – the ratio of the
elderly population to that of working age.
Between today and 2080, it is projected to more
than double. *,8 [See Figure 3-3]
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* In this same time period, the child dependency ratio – the ratio
of those under age 20 to those between 20 and 64 – is projected
to dip, as a result of gradually falling fertility. Nevertheless, this
drop is rather slight – from 0.49 to 0.43 between 2000 and 2080 –
and does little to counter the impact on dependency of the rapid-
ly increasing number of retirees. Between 2000 and 2080, the
total dependency ratio still jumps some 23 percent. This point is
reinforced when consumption is taken into account.  The costs of
supporting a retiree are higher, and can be expected to rise
much more rapidly, than the costs of supporting a child, due to
the skyrocketing price tag of health care for the elderly.      
Year
*The total fertility rate is the average number of children who would be born to a woman in her lifetime if she were to survive the  
entire childbearing period and experience the age-specific birth rates pertaining to the selected year.
Sources: 2002 OASDI Trustees' Report, Table V.A1, Intermediate Cost Assumptions; Felicitie Bell, Social Security Administration Area Projections: 1997  
(Washington, D.C.: Social Security Administration, 1997).
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The combination of a non-growing work-
force and a rapidly growing number of depend-
ents will put a brake on U.S. income growth –
both in absolute and per capita terms.  In
absolute terms, GDP growth can be expected to
decline as the expansion of the workforce slows
to a snail’s pace; fewer workers in the office and
on the production lines simply translate into
less output.  But at the same time that the
growth of total output slows, the number of
dependents will be increasing.  The nation,
therefore, will have to cut a more slowly grow-
ing GDP pie into smaller slices as the growth of
average per capita income declines.9
Slower income growth means fewer dollars
with which to save and consume, so that larger
proportions of income will be required to main-
tain the same growth in consumption standards.
In addition, Americans will be faced with
greater consumption needs.  Due to the high
cost of medical care, the consumption level of a
70 year-old retiree, on average, far exceeds the
consumption level of a 30 year-old.  By one esti-
mate, the average elderly American consumes
37 percent more than the average worker, much
of which is accounted for by public expendi-
tures on health care.10
Thus, future Americans will be in a vice –
squeezed on one side by sluggish income
growth and, on the other side, by increased
health care costs.  Working households could
expect to pay more to support the elderly both
directly, for their own elderly family members,
and indirectly, through their tax bills. These
households would then have less to spend on
themselves or to save. The elderly, too, would
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face cutbacks.  They could expect less direct
help from their families and reductions in
government pension and health care 
benefits.
Such a squeeze on consumption would be
difficult and painful.  But would it occur?  By
reducing national saving and shifting those
resources to consumption in both the public
and private sectors, our society could temporari-
ly avoid the hardship of retrenchment – but
only by effectively borrowing further from
future generations.
In the face of these demographic and eco-
nomic pressures, the public sector poses the pri-
mary threat to national saving.  The federal gov-
ernment is expected to bear much of the cost of
the population’s aging.  Currently, three federal
programs – Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid – provide some 60 percent of total
consumption by the elderly.11 The federal gov-
ernment has enormous difficulty in adopting
far-sighted policies, especially when those poli-
cies require fiscal austerity.  Ideally, the govern-
ment would protect the economic interests of
both current and future generations.  But,
short-sightedness tends to plague policymaking.
There is a great danger that policymakers will
avoid the painful fiscal adjustments that should
be undertaken now and during the demograph-
ic transition, at least before we finally reach a
social and economic crisis.  Compared with sig-
nificantly restraining public consumption
expenditures and increasing taxes, policymakers
are likely to find deficit spending to be the far
easier road to walk. 
Indeed, our current policies already put
America on a trajectory towards massive govern-
ment borrowing (or tax increases).  Projections
for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid
show expenditures under the existing programs
skyrocketing in coming years.  As of 2002, out-
lays for these three programs amounted to an
already considerable 7.6 percent of GDP.  An
aging population receiving Social Security bene-
fits that keep pace with wage growth and (espe-
cially) the rising costs of medical care are pro-
jected to push these outlays up to about 14 per-
cent of GDP by 2030 and some 20 percent of
GDP by 2070, as shown in Figure 3-4. 
Unless taxes were to rise dramatically to eco-
nomically damaging and politically infeasible
levels, this skyrocketing federal spending would
produce a rapidly deteriorating fiscal position.
One measure of this long-term budget crunch is
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Source: 2002 OASDI Trustees' Report, Table V.A2, Intermediate Cost Assumptions.
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the “fiscal gap” – the size of the immediate and
permanent reduction in expenditures and/or
increase in taxes required to keep government
debt from growing faster than GDP.  It is a
rough measure of how far we are from running
the government on a sound actuarial footing
and reflects in large part the future costs of
unfunded obligations in federal entitlement
programs.  CED estimates that the federal fiscal
gap through 2075 is nearly five percent of
GDP.12 This implies that, to keep the federal
debt from growing at an unsustainable rate over
this longer term, the federal government would
have to immediately cut spending or increase
taxes by roughly $500 billion per year – about a
23-26 percent reduction in expenditures or
increase in taxes – and maintain these policies
as an equivalent proportion of GDP in future
years.
At the same time that the federal govern-
ment may be deep in the red, households will
be strongly pressed to squeeze their personal
saving to maintain their consumption standards.
Certainly, as the baby boomers move from sav-
ing for retirement to drawing down their assets
in retirement, private saving will decline as pri-
vate pension funds and other private financial
assets shrink.  Whether households would even-
tually restore their saving to provide for a less
promising economic future is highly uncertain.
While reductions in private saving might not
become the principal drain on national saving,
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FIGURE 3-4
Long Term Pension and Healthcare Expenditures Will Explode
(Outlays as a Percent of GDP) 
private saving behavior might still exacerbate
the economic difficulties generated by balloon-
ing federal deficits.†
A VICIOUS CIRCLE OF SLOWER
GROWTH
By running large federal deficits and cutting
national saving, America would be essentially
mortgaging its economic future.  As explained
above, lower national saving in one year would
yield a smaller increase in the domestic capital
stock (or greater net international indebted-
ness) the next.  With less additional capital in
the hands of workers, the growth of labor pro-
ductivity would be diminished, and net income
from abroad would fall or grow more slowly as
well.  Both these factors would reduce the
growth of national income; future Americans
would be poorer so that today’s Americans
could live better.
To better articulate the potential implica-
tions of a decline in national saving, we employ
a simple long-term model of the U.S. econo-
my.13 Simulations even with large econometric
models are precarious, so the results of this rela-
tively simple model should be seen as illustra-
tive.  However, the model illustrates dramatical-
ly how the budgetary costs of population aging,
a decline in national saving, and reduced invest-
ment would tend to damage the economy.
In the model, we focus on the likely erosion
of federal government saving, since this repre-
sents the principal economic danger during the
demographic transition.  We assume (perhaps
optimistically) that the personal saving rate
remains unchanged.  To illustrate the implica-
tions of current federal policy, the model is
applied to three long-term scenarios – a base-
line scenario in which the federal budget con-
tinues on its present track, with Social Security
and health care expenditures growing as pro-
jected but revenues held constant at about the
current share of GDP; a scenario in which the
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FIGURE 3-5
Rising Deficits Under Current Policies Would Lead to A Collapse of Net National Saving
(Net National Saving as a Percent of Net National Product) 
† In theory, completely “rational” and far-seeing households might
quickly reduce their consumption to maintain their saving and
thereby provide for a future economic disappointment.  It seems
to us more likely that there would be considerable resistance to
such changes in living standards, so that households would only
slowly adjust their expectations and consumption.  This slower
adjustment would reduce the personal saving rate.
government cuts projected deficits by half from
2008 onwards; and a third scenario in which the
federal government permanently balances its
books by 2008.‡ The baseline trajectory of
budget expenditures is based on projections by
the Social Security and Medicare Trustees and
CBO.  However, the model incorporates the
more realistic assumptions about the trend of
budget deficits in 2004-2013 described in
Chapter 2.
The model tells an ominous story about the
dangers of continued and growing government
consumption and borrowing.  Staying on our
present track, spending for Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid skyrockets, while rev-
enues fail to keep pace. The federal government
deficit would balloon from approximately 1.6
percent of GNP in fiscal year 2002 to 10 percent
of GNP in 2030 and 29 percent in 2050.§
Plummeting federal saving would push net
national saving from its already low level of 2.5
percent of net national product in fiscal year
2002 to zero just after 2020, after which we would
begin to “consume” our capital stock, with new
investment insufficient to replace depreciated
capital.  [See Figure 3-5]  As the reduction in
national saving and investment proceeded, the
growth of productivity and income would suffer.
Whereas real GNP per capita is expected to grow
at about 2 percent annually during the next sev-
eral years, by the 2020’s, per capita income
growth would have fallen by more than half, and
by 2040 the model projects growth rates of very
nearly zero.  This is not to argue that such a dis-
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‡ In the latter two scenarios, the adjustment to the lower deficit
path is phased in from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008.
Revenues and expenditures are adjusted incrementally in each
year, so that deficits are halved, in one case, and eliminated, in
the other, by 2008.
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FIGURE 3-6
Deficits Would Slow Economic Growth
(Average Annual Growth of Real GNP per Capita) 
Growth with Balanced Budgets
Growth with Deficits Halved
Growth with Current Policies Continued
§ We use Gross National Product (GNP), as opposed to Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) to measure the size of the economy
and, by proxy, the standard of living.  Gross national product is
the measure of all income received by Americans, from domes-
tic or foreign sources, and is therefore the appropriate measure
when considering long-term per capita income growth.  Gross
domestic product measures total income generated within the
country – whether paid to Americans or foreigners. 
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mal economic future must come to pass, but that
the costs of inaction are severe.
To better illustrate the role of deficits in slow-
ing economic growth, we compare these results
with simulations from the two other scenarios in
which the federal government substantially
reduces its budget deficits.  The results are
shown in Figure 3-6.  Under these scenarios,
national saving is higher and long-term econom-
ic growth is more robust.  Although growth slows
initially even with balanced budgets from 2008
onwards, due to America’s changing demograph-
ics, it remains considerably stronger than under
the scenario of large government borrowing.
For example, by the 2030’s, the balanced budget
scenario yields an average annual real GNP per
capita growth rate of 1.8 percent – two and a half
times that expected if federal deficits remain
uncontrolled. In the balanced budget scenario,
these relatively robust growth rates would then
be maintained over the next several decades.
These simulations give a clear warning.  If
we do not change our current fiscal course, we
are inviting a low-growth economy.  Such a
steep and protracted rise in federal deficits and
fall in economic growth rates would be unprece-
dented.  Perhaps for the first time in this coun-
try’s history, most Americans could no longer
expect their children and grandchildren to
have higher living standards than their own.  To
avoid this bleak prospect, we need to act.
Chapter 4 details CED’s recommendations for
changing the course of fiscal policy to increase
national saving today, protect national saving
for the future, and safeguard the living stan-
dards of generations to come.
The analysis and projections presented
above show that our current budget policies, if
sustained, would significantly reduce long-term
economic growth and therefore the capacity of
our society to reach its widely shared private
and public goals.  Some of the underlying
forces driving us towards a low-saving and low-
growth future are inescapable; demography may
not be destiny, but it will relentlessly weigh
upon the economic outcomes possible and the
policy options available.  Other developments,
such as the rapid and broad expansion in our
international responsibilities and commitments
since September 11, 2001, while perhaps more
subject to deliberate choice, also seem likely to
introduce heavy new economic burdens.  How
should we respond to these demands upon our
resources?
While projections based on reasonable
assumptions about current budget policy show
future deficits rising to unprecedented peace-
time shares of the economy, such an outcome is
highly unlikely.  The public, perhaps – but cer-
tainly the financial markets – will not sit by pas-
sively as deficits rise to five, ten, and then twenty
percent of GDP and damage the economy.  As
noted CED economist Herb Stein once famously
held, “if something cannot continue, it will stop.”
Something has to give.  But what?  And when?  
UNPALATABLE CHOICES
The options for fiscal restraint today are
extremely unpalatable.  The list essentially boils
down to this:
1. Curtail homeland security expenditures –
when Americans face an unprecedented
threat from international terrorism and like-
ly homeland security costs already appear to
be substantially understated in the budget?
2. Restrict military spending – when threats in
the Middle East and North Asia imply a dra-
matic extension of U.S. responsibilities for
international security and stability through
the projection of military power, pacifica-
tion, and nation building? 
3. Reduce future Social Security benefits –
when the leading proposals for social securi-
ty “reform” from both parties would effec-
tively guarantee currently scheduled bene-
fits not only to current retirees, but to
future retirees as well?
4. Cut back on Medicare payments – when
there is widespread political agreement to
enact expensive prescription drug coverage,
an increasing lack of insurance coverage for
those 60-65, and a resumption of very rapid
increases in health care costs?
5. Curb Medicaid expenditures – when the
number of low-income families without
medical insurance continues to grow, and
states not only are cutting current Medicaid
expenditures, but also appear unlikely to be
able to sustain the current program in the
longer term?
6. Cut non-defense discretionary expenditures
– when special interest spending continues
unabated and most of the public investment
programs that support economic growth fall
into this category of expenditures?
7. Forgo additional personal tax cuts, or even
raise taxes – when the political commitment
to further tax reduction appears determined
and long-term tax cuts are advertised as the
means to accelerate short-term growth?
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It is hardly surprising that the effective
response to the question “what gives?” is usually
“none of the above.”  Similarly, when confront-
ed with such unpalatable choices and their
political implications, the response to the ques-
tion of when a major course correction must be
made is: “Later.”  Perhaps we will grow our way
out of the deficit; or the terrorist threat will
abate; or peace will break out in the Middle
East; or medical costs will stop rising.
CED has very different answers to both
these questions.
CAN WE “GROW OUR WAY OUT” OF
THE LONG TERM DEFICITS?
Those who resist the need to change our fis-
cal direction sometimes argue that, because our
large deficits in 2002-2004 are due in significant
part to the recent recession, economic growth
(aided by the growth-enhancing effects of tax
cuts) will raise enough revenues to solve “the
deficit problem.”
Some holding this view argue that full recov-
ery from the recent recession will take care of
the deficit.  The optimistic CBO projections–
without any further tax cuts– show the budget
moving back into balance by 2008, several years
after the recovery has been completed.
However, as Chapter 2 indicates, it appears
much more likely that budget policies will leave
us with significant and growing deficits at the
end of this decade even after we gain the addi-
tional revenues produced by a “full employ-
ment” economy.  The inevitable uncertainty sur-
rounding the projections leaves room for either
outcome.
But differences in projections for the next
decade have relatively minor implications for
the problem of long-term deficits.  There are
two reasons for this.  First, the rapid accelera-
tion of spending that will accompany an aging
population begins only at the end of the
decade, after which the problem becomes much
worse.  Second, once the economy has recov-
ered, revenues will grow roughly in line with its
productive capacity; there will be no more “rev-
enue bonuses” from economic recovery.  So the
critical question is whether tax cuts will have
long-term “supply-side” effects on productive
capacity that outweigh the negative effects pro-
duced by the larger deficits they entail.
Economic studies of these conflicting effects
indicate that, while lower marginal tax rates do
increase work and saving incentives for some
individuals, the positive effects of these incen-
tives are relatively modest and in the long term
will be more than offset by the growth-reducing
effects of the larger deficits they create.1
Another way to gauge the likelihood of
“growing our way out of the deficit” is to ask
how much faster the economy would have to
grow to eliminate the long-term budget deficit.
The simple long-term growth model described
in Chapter 3 can be used to make such an esti-
mate.  We increased economic growth in the
model by assuming more rapid increases in
total factor productivity while tax revenues
remained the same share of the economy (with
no additional tax cuts) and program expendi-
tures remained at their baseline levels, apart
from the automatic rise in Social Security bene-
fits that reflects higher wages.  Even under such
very conservative assumptions, the rate of pro-
ductivity growth would have to be about 50 per-
cent higher just to bring the budget into bal-
ance by the mid-21st century – and deficits
would still be rising for about the next thirty
years.  We know of no reputable analysis finding
that tax cuts would raise long-term productivity
growth by anything close to 50 percent.  And,
even then, we doubt that those who believe
growth to be a sufficient prescription to our fis-
cal problem have a fifty-year time frame in
mind.  Unfortunately, therefore, higher growth
will not appear like manna from heaven.  It will
require pro-growth policies.  And these will
require sacrifice and some very difficult choices.
WHAT GIVES? PRINCIPLES FOR FISCAL
POLICY CHOICES
We do not deny the difficulty of the choices
we face, but we do insist that we must make
them, however unpalatable.  It is far better that
we make them carefully and deliberately rather
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than in the crisis atmosphere that may ensue if
we leave them unattended.
We do not offer a set of detailed budget pro-
posals in this policy statement.  However, we do
describe below some recommended directions
for major long-term policy changes that we
believe would significantly alter our fiscal course
and improve prospects for the economic future.
Those recommendations are grounded in five
principles that we believe should inform any
long-term fiscal policy program.
1.  Any tenable budget program must address
the budget deficit on every front, including both com-
prehensive spending reductions and alternative or
additional revenues.  The very fact that our budg-
et policy options are so unpalatable suggests
one principle for addressing the problem.
Since there appear to be no large “low-priority”
targets that could bear most of the weight of
retrenchment, restraint must be imposed on a
wide front, involving all of the broad areas listed
above.  (At a programmatic level, of course, dis-
criminating choices must be made, as noted
below.)  A broad imposition of restraint will also
contribute to the sense of “shared sacrifice” that
we believe will be essential to achieve a responsi-
ble long term program.
2.  Do no harm.  The first step in climbing
out of a hole is to stop digging.  Given the great
contingent dangers as well as the enormous pre-
dictable costs that lie ahead, our current fiscal
course of “business as usual” is indefensible.
Since the 2001 tax cut was enacted, the trajecto-
ry of federal expenditures over this decade,
excluding proposed additions to the defense and
homeland security budgets and the possible
costs of war, has risen by about 2.2  percent of
GDP ($340 billion in 2010).  The longer term
trajectory of spending and revenues entails ever-
expanding entitlement spending and deficits
that imply a massive “fiscal gap” (or actuarial
shortfall) of about 5 percent of GDP as noted in
Chapter 3.2 We must begin to adapt today’s
“short-term” fiscal decisions to these realities.
Recent and pending proposals by the
Administration and decisions by the Congress
should be reexamined in this longer-term con-
text.  We believe it is simply not responsible (for
example) to adopt agriculture subsidy and relief
legislation that is largely divorced from need or
damages incurred; to continue military systems
addressed to the Cold War rather than our new
national security needs; to add prescription
drug benefits to Medicare without adopting
changes to improve the overall efficiency of the
program; or to enact additional tax cuts, even if
they have some economic merit, without taking
into account our fiscal problem.
3.  Make long-term budgetary balance and eco-
nomic growth explicit policy goals. As budget pres-
sures grow, there is a grave danger that other
goals will preempt fiscal balance and growth.
National and homeland security costs have
increased dramatically; retiree pension benefits
and health care costs are rising inexorably; and
tax reductions have become the dominant fea-
ture of budget policy.   Little attention is now
given to future deficits.  Indeed, the argument
that “deficits don’t matter” has now resurfaced,
after a twenty-year period in which Congress
worked on a bipartisan basis to reduce them.
Without long-term fiscal policy goals, U.S.
budget policy is adrift without an anchor.
Without an anchor, our budget policy will be
driven by the political winds.  And the political
system will reward budget decisions that pro-
duce quick benefits and defer costs.  It is essen-
tial that a recognition of the very large long-
term costs that loom ahead inform our decision
making.  
4.  Give pro-growth policies higher priority.  We
must avoid budget cuts that reduce public invest-
ments in favor of today’s consumption.  As the
budget deficit grows, there will be great pressure
to reduce expenditures that are “controllable”
and “deferrable,” given the difficulty of reducing
“uncontrollable” entitlement programs with very
large and politically powerful constituencies.   As
a result, a disproportionate burden of fiscal
restraint is likely to fall on annually appropriated
programs, including education and training pro-
grams that build human capital, research and
development programs that advance knowledge,
and infrastructure investments that support the
private sector.  A pro-growth fiscal policy
requires different priorities.
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5.  Distribute the costs of pro-growth policies
equitably.  A fiscal program for long-term growth
inevitably requires some reduction in current
private or public consumption to provide the
resources for investment.   The mechanism for
this reallocation is fiscal restraint – lower budget
expenditures and/or less tax reduction.  Who
should bear these costs?  We believe, as a gener-
al matter of “horizontal equity,” that programs
with widely shared benefits are preferable to
those with benefits tailored narrowly to few
recipients; and, as a matter of “vertical equity,”
that the costs of fiscal restraint should not be
placed disproportionately on low-income fami-
lies with little political voice.  As former OMB
Director David Stockman said, in a different era
but similar context, we should resist weak
claims, not weak claimants.3
COORDINATING LONG- AND SHORT-
TERM POLICIES: DO WE NEED MORE
FISCAL STIMULUS?
It is essential to distinguish between short-
term and long-term considerations in consider-
ing the timing of policy change.
We believe that we must begin immediately,
in the 2004 budget, to deal with the explosion
of the long-term deficit.  We hold this view for
three principal reasons:  First, increasing future
productive capacity by adding annual incre-
ments to our stocks of physical, human, and
knowledge capital takes time; the laws of com-
pound interest are generous in the longer term,
but the fruits of investment do not ripen
overnight.  Second, the longer we wait to make
budget corrections, the larger, more economi-
cally and socially disruptive, and more politically
difficult, those corrections will be.  For instance,
the changes in Social Security benefits or taxes
required to restore 75-year actuarial balance
would have to be about 25 percent larger if
made in 2014 rather than in 2004.4 Finally, we
candidly recognize that, in practice, adopting
policies to change our long-term budget course
will take time.  (It took approximately 15
painful years, from 1982 to 1997, to restore
budget balance after our last experience with
large and potentially exploding deficits.)
Because a shift towards budget restraint will be
necessarily lengthy, we would be well advised to
begin now.
However, this does not mean that a more
restrictive short-term fiscal policy should be
adopted for 2003 or 2004.  We recognize that
the U.S. economy is undergoing a slow and rela-
tively “jobless” recovery, in which continuing
large productivity gains are curtailing the
demand for labor, and business investment
remains weak in the shadow of geopolitical
uncertainty and the excess capacity created dur-
ing the euphoria of the late 1990’s boom.
Under these circumstances, policies to reduce
total public and/or private spending this year
and next would be unwise, since they risk fur-
ther weakening the recovery.
How, then, should we balance these short
and long-run concerns?  Immediately after the
terrorist attacks in September 2001, as the busi-
ness recession was gathering force, CED recom-
mended a program of short-term and temporary
fiscal stimulus.5 That, however, was sixteen
months ago.  A modest stimulus program was
subsequently adopted, and economic activity
has now been increasing gradually for about
one year.  CED believes that a more expansive
fiscal policy at present would be unnecessary
and imprudent. We hold this view for three rea-
sons:
1.  Unless a war produces a significant shock
to the economy, the recovery should accelerate
as uncertainty declines, excess capacity falls, and
the Federal Reserve maintains the monetary
easing initiated in 2001.  Recent fiscal policy has
been very expansive.  From 2001 to 2002, the
“high employment” budget became more stimu-
lative by $233 billion (2.3 percent of GDP);* the
economy has received total stimulus as large or
larger than the losses in output it has experi-
enced during the downturn.6 In addition “sup-
plementary” spending on military and home-
land security, war, and reconstruction is likely to
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* The change in the “high employment” (or “standardized-budg-
et”) surplus or deficit is a widely accepted measure of the fiscal
stimulus produced by changes in budget policies.
raise 2003-2004 federal expenditures well above
currently budgeted levels.
2.  Even if additional immediate and tempo-
rary economic stimulus were needed, the U.S.
legislative process virtually guarantees that any
fiscal program will be delayed in its enactment
and implementation.  Significant economic
effects from policy changes considered in the
next few months are unlikely to appear before
2004, when the economy is likely to be stronger
than today.  Such counterproductive timing lags
have been typical of U.S. fiscal policy.
3.  Most important, the current policy envi-
ronment suggests that any significant stimulus
program is likely to damage our long-term fiscal
position and undermine our growth objectives.
CED strongly opposes any short-term stimulus
program that is not combined with a plan to
restore longer-term budget balance.  We are
specifically concerned that the Jobs and Growth
Package proposed by the Administration, which
would raise the cumulative 2004-2013 deficit by
about $920 billion (including interest) and raise
the annual deficit ten years from now by about
$100 billion, does not meet this test. 7
As noted below, our objection to these pro-
posals is not directed at their merits as tax poli-
cy, but at their destructive long-term fiscal
impact.  There is a coherent argument, for
example, for eliminating the double-taxation of
dividends at the corporate level, and expert
observers from a variety of political perspectives
have pressed for tax simplification.  Our view,
however, is that the revenue losses generated by
such policies must be offset by other revenue
increases that would allow us to improve the
efficiency of the tax system without worsening
long-term fiscal problems.  
RECOMMENDED DIRECTIONS FOR
POLICY
Provide a Framework for Long-Term
Budgetary Decision Making
As noted in Chapter 2, the Congressional
budget process effectively self-destructed after
fiscal year 1998.  In some succeeding years no
budget resolution was adopted; in others, reso-
lutions were honored more in the breach than
observance; and in many instances they were
rendered ineffective by unrealistic spending tar-
gets and estimates.  Perhaps more important,
appropriation bills have been repeatedly
delayed and sometimes never completed, giving
rise to “omnibus” ad hoc spending legislation
that greatly impedes rational planning both by
public agencies and private recipients of gov-
ernment funds.  Such legislation also provides
fertile ground for narrow, self-interested spend-
ing projects.  In addition, the legislated budget
control mechanisms limiting discretionary
spending, entitlement expansion, and tax cuts
have now expired.  While these mechanisms
created by the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act
(BEA) were imperfect, they had bipartisan sup-
port and worked reasonably well in the early
and mid-1990’s to structure and enforce budget
decisions.  Budget decisions are now adrift,
without fiscal goals to anchor them or enforce-
able rules to discipline them.
CED believes it is urgent to implement a dis-
ciplined budget process that can address the
long-term fiscal issues that face us.  First,
Congress must restore rationality to the appro-
priations process.  Second, we should imple-
ment annual joint budget resolutions, agreed to
by the Congress and the President and enacted
into law, that anticipate, precede, and control all
spending and tax legislation.  Finally, to enforce
the budget decisions of the joint resolution, we
should restore caps on discretionary spending
and the requirement that changes in tax and
entitlement programs be “deficit-neutral.” We
commend the Administration for including
these proposals for budget process reform in its
2004 budget.
In addition to an effective process for deci-
sion making, rational budgeting today requires
goals that are consistent with long-term growth.
We recognize the importance of maintaining
flexibility in fiscal policy and the ineffectiveness
and futility of setting deficit targets independ-
ent of economic conditions, as attempted in the
late 1980s and proposed in legislation requiring
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annual balanced budgets.8 But it is essential
that fiscal policy be “anchored in the long run
by the need to preserve overall national saving
and prevent explosive growth in government
debt,” as recently stated by Federal Reserve
Governor Edward Gramlich.9
We make two recommendations to encour-
age this long-term anchoring of fiscal policy:
(1) The President and Congress should
establish a goal of balancing the budget (or pro-
ducing a surplus) excluding the “off-budget” Social
Security accounts over a rolling five-year horizon.
The joint budget resolution should make clear
how the budget policies of the resolution would
promote this goal. We recognize that we cannot
immediately move to a balanced budget, given
the fiscal hole we are now in.  While a five-year
horizon is hardly long-term, this policy would
have the effect of inhibiting near term fiscal
policy from “digging the hole deeper” and jeop-
ardizing long-run growth.  During a brief peri-
od in the late 1990’s, before the budget process
broke down, there appeared to be a bipartisan
consensus for such a policy target.  The exclu-
sion of the Social Security surplus from the cal-
culation of the deficit would, in effect, allow
those resources to be channeled, through debt
reduction, into national saving and investment
for growth rather than used to finance current
expenditures.† This would create a larger econ-
omy in future decades, when the Social Security
bill must be paid.
(2) The joint budget resolution should also
provide statistical measures of long-term fiscal
balance (such as the “fiscal gap” and unfunded
government liabilities) and explain how the
policies of the resolution would affect those
measures and future levels of taxes or public
debt. Simple cash-flow calculations of revenues,
expenditures, and the deficit—even taken over
a period of ten years—provide notoriously inad-
equate and misleading measures of long-term
fiscal balance and the sustainability of current
fiscal policy.  As noted in Chapter 2, our current
budget policies imply a “fiscal gap” over the life-
time of an American born today of about 5 per-
cent of GDP, and unfunded federal government
obligations of about $20 trillion, which are not
revealed by cash-flow accounting.  In addition,
this accounting leads to immediate budgetary
deceptions such as enacting tax cuts that are to
be “temporary” for ten years and made “perma-
nent” later. 
Ideally, our budget decisions would be con-
strained by the forward-looking measures we
recommend, and this may be an appropriate
long-term objective.10 However, even if it is
politically impractical at this time to formally
constrain budget decisions with such measures,
the information they provide should be avail-
able to inform such decisions.  That informa-
tion should become politically more salient as
public awareness of our long-term budget prob-
lems increases.  Such information might make
us think twice, for example, before adopting
new tax incentives for personal saving that raise
revenues slightly today but lose enormous
amounts of revenue indefinitely into the future,
despite our desire to increase the personal sav-
ing rate.
A budget process issue that has recently
caused considerable controversy is that of
“dynamic scoring” – that is, attempting to incor-
porate in budget estimates the full effects of tax
and spending policy changes on the macro-
economy.*  As a theoretical matter, of course,
dynamic scoring is an appropriate procedure;
no one would deny that changes in tax rates, or
in the design of many public spending pro-
grams, have such effects, and they should logi-
cally be reflected in the estimates.  However, as
a practical matter, dynamic scoring is extremely
problematic, as noted by the recent Director of
the Congressional Budget Office, Dan L.
Crippen, who has testified that CBO “could
not…include those macroeconomic effects in a
useful and credible way.”11 First, such effects
are extremely sensitive to future fiscal and mon-
etary policy decisions, which cannot be predict-
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† CED first recommended such a policy in 1947 when it proposed
a budget balanced over the business cycle rather than annually,
the widely accepted fiscally conservative target.  The proposal
here effectively adapts that proposal to current demographic
conditions. *See memorandum by CHARLES E.M. KOLB. (page 40).
ed.  Second, the size—and even direction—of
such effects are highly uncertain; different mod-
els and assumptions produce very different
results.  But the most important problem is that
the application of dynamic scoring would
inevitably be extremely political, since the high-
ly controversial estimates of these “dynamic”
effects would directly affect the fate of legisla-
tive proposals operating under meaningful
budget constraints, such as those we recom-
mend.  We acknowledge that informational and
experimental estimates by CBO and the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), based on a
variety of models and assumptions, might be
useful to policymakers.  But we believe that
dynamic scoring of CBO’s official cost estimates
would inevitably inject politics deep into what
should be an expert, non-political estimating
process and greatly damage the credibility and
reputation of CBO.  We therefore oppose the
use of dynamic scoring for official CBO cost
estimates of policy proposals.
Reform Major Entitlement Programs
As shown in Chapter 2, the anticipated
rapid growth of public pension and health care
benefits for the elderly will dramatically raise
federal spending and budget deficits, reducing
national saving and private investment while
crowding out public investments in the budget.
In addition, these programs threaten to be gen-
erationally inequitable, in that they will transfer
enormous resources from future workers to
baby boom retirees.  The demographic transi-
tion will make a substantial transfer of resources
to older Americans appropriate and inevitable,
but we must carefully reexamine the design of
these programs to ensure they are consistent
with our larger social objectives.
Social Security The Social Security system
cannot meet its future legal obligations and
must be reformed.  Under current projections,
the trust fund’s surplus of contributions over
benefits will peak at the end of this decade,
then begin to fall, and vanish in 2017.  After
this, the trust fund will be drawn down, and full
scheduled benefits can only be paid until it is
exhausted in 2041.12
But the trust fund accounting device gives
the mistaken misimpression that the crisis will
not occur for many decades.  As an economic
matter, the trust fund is essentially irrelevant; the
relevant measure is the difference between the
public’s contributions to and withdrawals from
the federal Treasury.  As soon as this difference
begins to narrow–in about 2011–the capacity of
Social Security to offset deficits in the rest of the
unified budget will begin to fall, making the
overall deficit, and Treasury’s financing needs,
larger.13 This deterioration will then simply
accelerate when the trust fund actually begins
to pay out more than it takes in, causing the
Treasury to sell trust fund securities for cash.
The effects of Social Security on the financial
markets, and pressures for “crowding out” pri-
vate investment, will therefore begin to increase
around the end of this decade.  In fact, such
effects may be reflected even earlier, as such
increases in the government’s financing needs
are anticipated in the marketplace.
Proposals have been made to allow the
Social Security to purchase private equities
instead of Treasury debt, or to allow individuals
to do so through private accounts, or to infuse
more general revenues into the system.
However, such reforms often do little to address
the economic problem underlying Social
Security’s financing dilemma—that we have
committed ourselves to very large increases in
public consumption without ensuring that we
have additional resources to provide them,
which can become available only through eco-
nomic growth.
In Fixing Social Security (1997), CED propos-
es reforms that address the financial solvency
of the current system, its generational
inequities, and the need for national saving.14
We recommend a two-tier system: the current
basic system, with its benefit structure modified
to ensure its solvency, supplemented by a sec-
ond tier of privately owned Personal Retirement
Accounts that would raise returns to future
retirees.  The plan is described in Box 1:  CED’s
Proposal to Reform Social Security.
Medicare and Medicaid Increasing health
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BOX 1
CED's Proposal to Reform Social Security
The CED plan for reforming Social Security would preserve the current basic system but
modify its structure to restore solvency and increase national saving.  In addition, it would give
workers the opportunity to earn higher investment returns by establishing a "second tier" of 
privately owned Personal Retirement Accounts.
The changes in the basic system, to be phased-in gradually, would include:
• The initial benefit levels of upper- and middle-income workers, which currently rise with
wages, would increase more slowly (but continue to rise in real terms).
• The normal retirement age (NRA), currently 65 years, would gradually increase to 70 over
a period over 30 years and be indexed to life expectancy thereafter.  (The NRA is 
currently scheduled to rise to 67 between 2003 and 2026.)
• The early retirement age, currently 62 years, would be increased to 65 over this 30 year
period and subsequently similarly indexed.
• The years of covered employment included in the calculation of initial benefits would be
gradually increased from 35 to 40.
• Benefits from the basic program in excess of contributions made by the worker would be
taxed, with the additional revenues to be deposited in the Social Security trust funds. 
• A reduction in benefits for nonworking spouses from one-half to one-third of the 
worker's benefit would be phased-in gradually to improve equity between working and
non-working spouses. 
• To make coverage universal, all new state and local government employees would be
required to participate and current employees could choose to participate. 
CED also proposes the creation of privately owned, personal retirement accounts (PRAs): 
• Both employers and employees would be required to contribute 1.5 percent of payroll to
privately owned personal retirement accounts. (The self-employed would contribute 3
percent.) These mandatory accounts would receive preferential tax treatment similar to
401(k) plans and would be subject to appropriate fiduciary regulations, including a
requirement that accumulated funds be preserved for retirement.  The Federal Thrift
Savings Plan provides a general model for these accounts.
Source: Committee for Economic Development (CED), Fixing Social Security, (Washington, D.C.: CED, 1997); CED,
New Opportunities for Older Workers, (Washington, D.C.: CED, 1999).
care expenditures by the elderly are the most
dramatic example of the consumption changes
expected in an aging society.   But it is essential
that we view this problem in its appropriate con-
text, given that so much discussion focuses on
the “burdens” involved in these expenditures.
The 20th century saw enormous improvements in
the quality of life, and in some cases longevity,
for many elderly.  It has been estimated that
improvements in the health status of the popula-
tion during the 20th century made as large a con-
tribution to economic welfare as all other con-
sumption increases combined.15 Health care is
highly valued by the American public, and it is
entirely appropriate that we devote an increas-
ing proportion of national income and output
to it as the society grows more affluent and new
technology improves possibilities for treatment.
Notwithstanding these considerations, how-
ever, it is clear that the U.S. health care system
is unsustainable and that overuse, underuse,
and misuse of health care services produce both
adverse medical outcomes and unnecessary
costs, as we argued in A New Vision for Health
Care: A Leadership Role for Business (2002).  The
health care industry, while making dramatic
technological advances in diagnosis and treat-
ment, is extremely inefficient in delivering care,
and patients have little stake in costs and insuffi-
cient awareness of wide differences in provider
quality.16 The U.S. now spends twice as much
on health care, per capita, as other nations with
equal life expectancies.  We do not claim to know
the “right” proportion of our national income that
should be spent on health care in the future, but we
firmly believe the resources we do provide should lead
to higher quality and more cost-efficient care.
A major source of unnecessarily high costs of
health care is the lack of incentives to seek high-
er quality and lower costs on the part of both
providers and purchasers of care.  Our recom-
mendations for improving those incentives for
businesses and other private purchasers of care
are detailed in our earlier report and need not
be repeated here.  But public purchasers such as
Medicare (the largest purchaser of health care)
and some state governments are ineffective pur-
chasers of care.  Fee-for-service Medicare is
required by law to be a passive payer of providers’
bills and has no authority to reward providers of
high quality and effectively managed care.  While
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) has begun to make information on quality
of care available to Medicare enrollees, the pro-
gram lacks financial incentives to select the best
performing providers.  
We therefore reiterate our earlier recom-
mendation that Medicare be restructured along
the lines of the Federal Employee Health
Benefit Program (FEHBP). FEHBP, a highly
successful plan covering nine million federal
workers and their dependents, has adopted a
defined contribution model that creates incen-
tives for workers to select cost-effective health
plans with affordable employee contributions.
We caution, however, that even with reforms in
Medicare that improve its efficiency, we are
unlikely to face long-term costs that greatly
reduce the long-term costs currently projected.
Indeed, the Administration roughly estimates
that its “Medicare Modernization,” including
both prescription drug coverage and cost-reduc-
ing reforms, will add $400 billion to Medicare
costs over the next decade.
Many states have developed for their public
employees, and in some cases for Medicaid
enrollees, health care programs similar to
FEHBP, with contribution structures that
encourage choices based on appraisals of quali-
ty and cost.  CED also urges states that have not
adopted such programs to do so as a means of
improving both the quality of health care and
the efficiency of its delivery.
While our recommendations here focus on
public expenditures for health care, we note
that, as in the case of Social Security, the funda-
mental economic issue facing our society is not
the financing of these particular programs, but
the total resources used in meeting the health
care needs of the entire population in the
future.  For this reason, CED’s recent recom-
mendations for improving the quality and effi-
ciency of all health care services are most rele-
vant to our concerns here about the future well
being of our society. These recommendations
are detailed in Box 2.
33
Chapter 4:  Budget Policies for Growth
Exploding Deficits, Declining Growth: The Federal Budget and the Aging of America
34
BOX 2
CED’s Vision for Health Care
CED’s policy statement, A New Vision for Health Care: A Leadership Role for Business (2002) pro-
posed policies through which private employers and the government, as the principal purchasers of
health care, could improve its efficiency and quality.  The plan does not address every aspect of
America’s burgeoning health care crisis.  Nevertheless, the adoption of certain of its recommenda-
tions would help slow the unsustainable growth of health care costs that is a central element in our
long-term budget problem.     
Private employers can change their purchasing practices in ways that would enhance cost disci-
pline and quality by:
• Demanding transparent quality information and adherence to best medical practices;
using comparative performance information to select plans and providers; and incorporat-
ing accountability for cost and quality into contract specifications;
• Offering wide, responsible health plan choices to employees in exchange for their greater
financial responsibility; 
• Working actively with physicians and hospitals to improve quality, building on the
strengths of managed care; and 
• Working with public purchasers and organized labor to strengthen the drive for reform.
The federal government, as purchaser, lawmaker, and regulator of health care can address the
problems of high cost and uneven quality by:
• Restructuring Medicare on the model of the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program;
• Capping the currently open-ended federal tax exclusion of employer contributions to pro-
mote cost discipline and equity; this could also provide some funding for policies to
expand access; 
• Enacting responsible patients’ rights legislation that protects patients against unwarranted
delays or denials of care, without prohibiting payments mechanisms that reward appropri-
ate and effective standards of care or exposing businesses to unlimited litigation costs. 
• Addressing the most pressing quality problems – lack of patient safety and widespread
delivery of inappropriate services – by expanding research, serving as a clearinghouse for
information on quality, and helping to establish national standards of care;
• Establishing oversight to promote competition in health insurance markets; and
• Strengthening initiatives to reduce fraud and abuse in Medicare and Medicaid. 
Source: Committee for Economic Development (CED), A New Vision for Health Care: A Leadership Role for Business,
(Washington, D.C.: CED, 2002).
National and Homeland Security
Expenditures
The terrorist attacks of September 2001
have inevitably raised both federal and state and
local government expenditures on public health
and safety, and the expanded U.S. international
role that has emerged since then has produced
a sharp increase in current and planned mili-
tary expenditures.  As we argued shortly after
the attacks, while a significant reallocation of
public resources is undoubtedly necessary to
deal with these new responsibilities, “we must
not let these security concerns eclipse the need
for sound economic policies, both domestic and
international.  In the long term, the health of
our economy will largely determine the well-
being of our society, including our capacity to
provide safety and security.”17
In the current environment, there is a temp-
tation to assume that budget constraints are no
longer operative where security is concerned
and that we must “spend whatever it takes.”
However, quite the opposite is true – reconcil-
ing large, immediate public needs with other
public goals, and with private consumption and
investment demands, will require more strin-
gent budget discipline, not less.  Our policies
must distinguish carefully between what we gen-
uinely need for an adequate defense and the
wish-lists of the military and its suppliers.
Adequacy must be evaluated in a world where
our 2003 defense budget is larger than those of
the next 17 nations combined, and the 2001-
2002 increase in defense spending was larger
than Japan’s total 2002 defense budget, the
world’s fourth largest.18
Early in 2001, the Administration discussed
restructuring the defense budget by eliminating
or reducing programs and activities that reflect-
ed outdated Cold War defense requirements.  It
suggested, therefore, skipping a generation of
expensive weapons systems.19 However, there is
little evidence of such restructuring in the cur-
rent defense budget, which appears to have
“essentially reaffirmed the Clinton
Administration’s weapons modernization agen-
da and force structure” at higher expenditure
levels, raising the long-term defense budget by
about $100 billion per year.20 The high costs
and inefficiencies of the ongoing operations
and maintenance activities of the military also
give us concern as business leaders.  The prob-
lems go well beyond the expensive continuing
operation of unnecessary military bases driven
by Congressional politics.   The Tail-to-Tooth
Commission, a study group of the non-partisan
Business Executives for National Security
(BENS), recently reported on its review of
major studies of military expenditures.  The
Commission found widespread and costly ineffi-
ciencies in acquisition and accounting functions
as well as in “non-military” activities such as the
provision of housing, and made numerous rec-
ommendations for improving efficiency.
Specifically, the Commission noted that twenty
years ago, two-thirds of the defense budget was
devoted to military combat capability (“tooth”)
and one-third to overhead and indirect support
expenditures (“tail”); today, the proportions are
reversed.
We claim no special expertise on national
security needs, but given the fiscal outlook we
believe that the claims of respected defense ana-
lysts that we could secure a more effective
defense capability for $50 billion less than the
$500 billion per year now projected for the end
of the decade deserve serious examination.21
But, whatever the level of spending, the defense
budget must be cost-effective and focused
sharply on our new national security situation.
We urge the Administration and the Congress to
rapidly establish national defense priorities and
program reforms to accomplish this.
With respect to homeland security, it is evi-
dent that spending should and will rise substan-
tially over time as we develop greater capability
to protect against and respond to terrorist
attacks.  Here again, however, it is essential that
we prioritize, even though it is politically very
difficult to do so.  We cannot protect against all
eventualities.  Some attacks are more likely than
others, some are potentially far more damaging
than others, and we must choose.  In making
these choices, we should also remember that
the benefits of stronger homeland security
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often involve higher costs to the economy as
well as to the budget.
Decision making for homeland security may
be especially problematic, since it will be princi-
pally the responsibility of the new Department
of Homeland Security, which is attempting to
combine many previous federal departments
and agencies, with very different missions, into
a single effective organization.  (The new
Department will handle about two-thirds of total
homeland security spending.)  It will be very dif-
ficult, at least initially, for such an organization
to set priorities that appropriately reflect the
overall security situation rather than the various
missions of the former agencies.  This will cre-
ate strong pressures to increase the budget to
cover more contingencies.  An additional budg-
etary problem will arise because of the difficul-
ties in preventing duplication of functions and
personnel, in spite of the additional managerial
flexibility provided for the new Department.
For all these reasons, we believe that homeland
security expenditures will require special atten-
tion and scrutiny in the next few years, and we
urge the Administration and Congress to pro-
vide this.
Finally, should another terrorist attack be
made in the United States, it is likely that, once
again, those responding to it will not be prima-
rily federally-trained experts or the armed serv-
ices, but local police, fire, and other person-
nel.22 These community forces are the front
line in our national battle against terror, and
the federal government must ensure that they
have the resources needed to do the job.
Non-Security Discretionary Spending
Given the political difficulties in reducing
expenditures on “permanently” funded entitle-
ment programs in comparison with programs
funded with annual appropriations, it is not sur-
prising that the latter have been the favored tar-
gets for controlling federal expenditures.  The
last quarter-century has seen an inexorable
“crowding out” of discretionary spending by
entitlement programs, which have expanded
from about 51 percent of total non-interest fed-
eral expenditures in the late 1970s to 62 per-
cent in 2002, while discretionary spending has
fallen commensurately from about 49 percent
to 38 percent.  Most of this decline, however,
has occurred in defense discretionary spending,
which has experienced a decades-long decline
relative to the total budget and the size of the
economy.  Since the 1960s, defense spending
has fallen from about 8.5 to 3.5 percent of GDP.
By comparison, non-defense discretionary
spending in relation to the budget and the
economy is roughly the same as it was 40 years
ago.  Defense spending obviously cannot contin-
ue to fall at this rate relative to GDP in the
future, so either the growth of non-defense dis-
cretionary spending relative to GDP must fall or
that of total discretionary spending must rise.
Clearly there are many low-priority domestic
discretionary programs, and reductions in them
have been entirely appropriate.  (Indeed, it is
unfortunate that so few have actually been elim-
inated.)  We hold no brief for protecting these
programs in general, and especially the politi-
cally “ear-marked” spending that rewards nar-
row interests.  We can and should bring the rate
of growth of non-security discretionary spend-
ing below its historical level and far below the 9
percent growth of the past three years.
Although the Administration sought to restrain
such growth, the enacted omnibus 2003 appro-
priations bill has raised discretionary spending
about $12 billion above the level earlier agreed
to by the President and the Congressional
majority leadership.  The untimely and chaotic
process of enacting 2003 appropriations has
dramatically demonstrated the need for the
strong process reforms we propose, and the his-
tory of this ad hoc legislation increases our con-
cern that insufficient discrimination will be
made between effective and ineffective pro-
grams.  As budgetary pressures grow in the
future, it will be more difficult to sustain invest-
ment programs that support economic growth.
Two areas of investment cause us particular con-
cern—public education and research and devel-
opment.
CED has long advocated both reforms and
increased investments in public education, espe-
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cially in improving poorly performing schools
in many low-income communities, and in mov-
ing towards universal pre-school.23 We must
improve the achievement of children attending
low-performing schools both to support eco-
nomic growth and to promote equal opportuni-
ty.  We have argued that improvements in learn-
ing will require more attention to, and account-
ability for, educational outcomes, and for that
reason have supported federal legislation and
state initiatives designed to do this.  But we have
also noted the serious difficulties likely to arise
in implementing such accountability meas-
ures.24 We are now at a critical juncture in
these reform efforts.  The states have been
given a task of raising the achievement test
scores of all students, which would be enor-
mously difficult in the best of circumstances.  In
the circumstances they actually face, many states
and communities are ill-prepared to meet these
goals, and the fiscal crises facing most states will
severely limit the resources they can draw upon
to do so.  We believe that education reform is
too important to be allowed to fail; the federal
government, which has mandated a national
effort, is obligated to assist the states in making
it work.  We urge the Administration and
Congress to provide the funding needed to do
so.
CED found in an earlier study that basic
research in science and engineering has made a
major contribution to the growth of the U.S.
economy.  Economic returns on investments in
basic research are very high. In addition, the
returns to the nation from basic research invest-
ments are substantially higher than the returns
to private firms, since advances in fundamental
knowledge tend to be widely dispersed and
exploited in innovations that deliver substantial
economic benefits over a lengthy period.25
Publicly-funded basic research is critical to
private sector innovation. Although private indus-
try conducts basic research, these efforts are pri-
marily to “fill-in-the-gaps” within broader pro-
grams of applied research aimed at new product
development.  Industry depends on the intellec-
tual foundations provided by basic researchers in
the nonprofit and public sectors for innovative
products and services; 73 percent of research
publications cited by industrial patents have been
found to be derived from government-funded
research.26
Because federal support is essential for
a thriving basic research enterprise, we urge the
Administration and Congress to make
basic research a high priority in the federal
budget.  Funding should be provided across a
broad set of research fields, without undue con-
centration in medical research.
We have also found that deficiencies in sci-
ence teaching in primary and secondary educa-
tion threaten our future supply of outstanding
young researchers.  We will provide a series of
recommendations in a forthcoming report to
address this problem.27
As noted above, expenditures on discre-
tionary non-defense spending have grown at
about the same rate as the economy for many
years.  We are certainly no admirers of formula-
ic budgeting, and support the reduction and
elimination of low-priority programs whenever
possible.  But our budgetary history suggests
there are significant social and political limits to
such reductions.  In light of the need to contin-
ue high-priority programs, and in particular
public investments, we believe it would be
imprudent to assume that domestic discre-
tionary expenditures in the aggregate will grow
continuously more slowly than the economy in
the future. 
Taxes*
CED has for many years, and in many policy
statements, taken the position that the federal
government should balance its budget, averaged
over years of economic strength and weakness.28
As explained in Chapter 1, we strongly believe
that deficits do matter to our long term growth
and prosperity.  We do not believe that we should
deliberately run budget deficits as a means to dis-
cipline spending.  This has not worked in the
past and is a counsel of despair.  Deliberately
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Endnotes
hamstringing future Congressional decision mak-
ing cannot be good public policy; Congress
should, and can, budget effectively with the deci-
sion making framework described above.
We believe that additional reductions in fed-
eral revenues would be inconsistent with the goal
of long-term budgetary balance.  The analysis in
Chapters 2 and 3 shows that realistic projections
of federal expenditures and revenues, especially
when combined with further tax reductions, pro-
duce deficits that grow significantly during the
coming decade and explode thereafter.
Of course, if extremely large spending
reductions could be made—in the face of the
demographic, social, and political facts and our
escalating security requirements—we could
afford to reduce revenues further, at least in the
medium term.  However, after reviewing the
size of our long-term fiscal imbalance and the
broad possibilities for spending reductions in
Social Security, Medicare, national defense,
homeland security, and other domestic pro-
grams, CED  believes it extremely unlikely that the
long-term budget problem can be solved without
additional revenues.  We therefore urge the
Administration and Congress to forego at this
time any additional tax reductions (including
the permanent extension of EGTRRA) that
would further reduce long-term revenues.
Moreover, we should use this opportunity to
begin to explore alternative or additional long-
term sources of revenue and taxation systems
that support our long-term growth objectives.
CONCLUSION
America now stands at a fiscal crossroad.
The federal government’s fiscal position look-
ing out over the next decade has deteriorated
to an alarming degree.  At the same time, we
draw closer each day to the dramatic demo-
graphic changes that will sharply increase those
fiscal difficulties, with adverse economic conse-
quences, if we remain on our current course.  It
is urgent that we begin to act now to adopt a
program of policy changes, across a broad front,
that address our inadequate process for making
budget decisions and the untenable trends in
federal entitlement programs, discretionary
spending, and revenues that threaten the eco-
nomic future of the nation.
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The Policy Statement indicates that there is a
real danger that we will face significant deficits in
the coming years and reaffirms that deficits matter.
The Policy Statement goes on to state: We need to
control the growth of federal expenditures. Our
Congressional control process has broken down in
recent years, and it needs to be reestablished. We
need to commit to raise the revenues required to
balance the budget over the economic cycle. We
need to adopt economic and tax policies that will
facilitate economic growth. These views are vintage
CED and need restating. 
The Policy Statement unfortunately loses its
focus by attempting to be timely and relevant in the
context of the current partisan forecasting debate. I
am concerned that the Report will not have the
desired long-term policy impact because it will be
viewed as just another political document.
Page 1, THOMAS J. BUCKHOLTZ.
The Recommendations (pages 2 and 3) note
themes (such as growth, deficits, and fiscal pru-
dence) and programs (such as Social Security and
education reform).
The intent to make progress regarding each
item is laudable, but may not provide an adequate
framework for capturing the broader opportunities
and addressing the broader challenges for which
each item provides examples.
A broader approach can focus first on desired
future outcomes, with categories being ones such as
national security (international and homeland), qual-
ity of life (e.g., safety, freedom, education, healthcare,
and retirement), the economy (e.g., international
and domestic commerce), and infrastructure (e.g.,
environment, energy, information technology, and
transportation).  People can formulate, debate, and
advance principles, visions, or goals for the entire col-
lection of categories, individual categories, and parts
of categories.  From there, the country can formulate
and implement programs or program modifications
that reasonably balance estimated future needs, esti-
mated future resources (including government rev-
enues), and past commitments.  Programs can
become simpler, with leadership being more clearly
rooted in appropriate entities in the private sector or
one or more levels of government.
For example, absent such an approach the
Social Security retirement program remains a past
and continuing commitment for which debate
potentially overly centers not on needs of people or
purposes of the program but instead on maintaining
or altering formulas that are rooted in decades-old
assumptions.  Which such an approach, American
society has a better basis for providing services – per-
haps focused on quality of life – aimed at meeting
individuals’ and society’s future needs and at honor-
ing past and future contributions.
An outcome of such an effort can be clearer-pur-
posed, simpler governance.  The steps to achieving
such can catalyze beneficial public involvement in
setting policies.
Page 30, CHARLES E.M. KOLB.
As to the practicality of dynamic scoring, I am
more optimistic that such an approach can be tried
without injecting undue “political” influence on the
integrity of the Congressional Budget Office’s official
cost estimates.  We know that the traditional “static”
scoring process does not capture the complete macro-
economic effects, or incentive effects, of changes in
tax and spending policies.  An effort to identify such
effects through a dynamic analysis that is fully trans-
parent in terms of its underlying assumptions is worth
implementing.  A dynamic “analysis” – to be distin-
guished from dynamic “scoring” which produces a
single number as the projected cost of a particular
bill – would present a range of estimates that would,
on balance, be more informative to the Congress
than a single number based on “static” scoring.
Page 37, JAMES Q. RIORDAN, with which PETER A.
BENOLIEL has asked to be associated.
The weakest part of the Policy Statement is its
discussion of tax policy. CED has made clear that our
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Page 1, JAMES Q. RIORDAN, with which
THOMAS J. BUCKHOLTZ has asked to be
associated.
current social security and health care systems are
not sustainable and must be reformed. We should be
equally clear that our current tax system is not sus-
tainable and must be reformed.
At tax system must raise revenues needed to bal-
ance the budget over the economic cycle and must
do it in ways that facilitate economic growth. At a
minimum, this means that the tax system must be
less complicated and less biased against saving.
Furthermore, as stated by Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Alan Greenspan, it will be self-defeating if
it attempts to commandeer too much of the national
economy. Admittedly, these objectives are easier to
state than to achieve. Unfortunately, they will not be
achieved by the proposals of the Republican
Administration; the Democratic congressional lead-
ership; or the tax proposals in this CED report. 
We need a thoughtful, comprehensive approach
to reforming the tax system for the long term. I
hope that CED will soon take the lead in that effort
as it has attempted to do in the case of the Social
Security and health care systems.  
Page 37, JOSH S. WESTON, with which 
PETER A. BENOLIEL, T.J. DERMOT DUNPHY, and
ROCCO C. SICILIANO have asked to be associated. 
The prospect of huge, ongoing deficits should
lead us to reconsider previous proposals for an
increased gas (motor fuel) tax. The case is com-
pelling. 
Federal Deficits – Each penny per gallon tax is
worth one billion dollars in extra annual rev-
enue. (The gas tax in most European countries
is almost two dollars per gallon higher than
ours.)
Dependence on Middle East Oil – The U.S.
depends greatly upon the Middle East. This cre-
ates a huge unfavorable national security cost
plus constraints on foreign policy, while holding
our security and economy hostage to foreign dis-
ruptions. (60 percent of our oil comes from
abroad.) 
Unfavorable Trade Balance – We had a $435 bil-
lion trade deficit in 2002, much due to oil
imports. It is draining our capital. A gas tax
would indirectly discourage oil imports. 
The Need for Cleaner Air – Reduced gas con-
sumption can improve air quality and climate
concerns. It would also help narrow our “Kyoto
gap” with other nations. 
The Prospective Graying of America – Our aging
population will place huge demands on the
Social Security and Medicare systems. They can-
not be handled without more federal revenues
and/or reduced benefits.  
Legislation to increase our present pump tax by
10 cents annually for each of the next twenty years
would induce changes in miles per gallon and auto
usage, while providing incremental federal revenue.
This price change is much smaller than usual past
market fluctuations, which have not had noticeable
economic effects. Consumers already often pay more
for a gallon of bottled water than for gas. 
A gas tax is simple to administer and difficult to
evade. It would give automobile makers greater con-
fidence to invest in energy-saving technologies,
whether through vehicle weight, engine efficiency,
fuel choice, or other means. And, it would promote
mass transit. 
Between 1975 and 1988, the average fuel econo-
my of the U.S. vehicle fleet rose from 15 miles per
gallon to 26; since then, it has not improved. It is
time to take action to restore the earlier, helpful
trend. In time, the benefits of better energy efficien-
cy and environmental performance would offset the
burden of the tax. 
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The Policy Statement urges the Congress and
the Administration to begin to explore “alternative
or additional long-term sources of revenue and taxa-
tion systems that support our long-term growth
objectives.”  To the extent that this admonition sug-
gests that we should contemplate raising taxes at this
time, I express my reservations.  We should avoid
policies and exacerbate our long-term structural
deficit while at the same time seek ways to reduce
spending.  One way to achieve this goal is for the
Congress to enact the type of budget-process con-
straints that will ensure a more disciplined approach
to spending.  CED endorses such reforms with which
I concur.  However, given the current state of the
U.S. economy, now is not the time for a discussion of
tax increases.
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For 60 years, the Committee for Economic
Development has been a respected influence on
the formation of business and public policy.
CED is devoted to these two objectives: 
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommendations
for private and public policy that will contribute to
preserving and strengthening our free society, achiev-
ing steady economic growth at high employment and
reasonably stable prices, increasing productivity and
living standards, providing greater and more equal
opportunity for every citizen, and improving the qual-
ity of life for all.
To bring about increasing understanding by pres-
ent and future leaders in business, government, and
education, and among concerned citizens, of the
importance of these objectives and the ways in which
they can be achieved.
CED’s work is supported by private volun-
tary contributions from business and industry,
foundations, and individuals. It is independent,
nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical.  
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that com-
mend themselves as guides to public and busi-
ness policy; that can be used as texts in college
economics and political science courses and in
management training courses; that will be con-
sidered and discussed by newspaper and maga-
zine editors, columnists, and commentators;
and that are distributed abroad to promote bet-
ter understanding of the American economic
system.  
CED believes that by enabling business lead-
ers to demonstrate constructively their concern
for the general welfare, it is helping business to
earn and maintain the national and community
respect essential to the successful functioning of
the free enterprise capitalist system.
OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
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Restoring Prosperity: Budget Choices for Economic Growth (1992)
The United States in the new Global Economy: A Rallier of Nations (1992)
*Statements issued in association with CED counterpart organizations in foreign countries.
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CED COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS
Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and independent, non-
political research organizations in other countries.  Such counterpart groups are composed of
business executives and scholars and have objectives similar to those of CED, which they pursue
by similarly objective methods.  CED cooperates with these organizations on research and study
projects of common interest to the various countries concerned.  This program has resulted in a
number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as energy, assistance to
developing countries, and the reduction of nontariff barriers to trade.
CE Circulo de Empresarios
Madrid, Spain
CEAL Consejo Empresario de America Latina
Buenos Aires, Argentina
CEDA Committee for Economic Development of Australia
Sydney, Australia
CIRD China Institute for Reform and Development
Hainan, People’s Republic of China
EVA Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies
Helsinki, Finland
FAE Forum de Administradores de Empresas
Lisbon, Portugal
IDEP Institut de l’Entreprise
Paris, France
IW Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Koeln
Cologne, Germany
Keizai Doyukai
Tokyo, Japan
SMO Stichting Maatschappij en Onderneming
The Netherlands
SNS Studieförbundet Naringsliv och Samhälle
Stockholm, Sweden
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